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 No one doubts that the question needs  
answering. By general consent, improving the  
cost-benefit balance in America’s health care is today’s 
most urgent public policy problem. Costs are rising for  
private payers and government (which now accounts 
for more than half of all health care spending), but 
health outcomes are not rising at the same rate. 
Without changes, health costs could stress federal 
and state governments to the point of near-insolvency 
as the Baby Boom generation ages and as ever more 
expensive technology comes online. Health costs  
also affect jobs because some employers respond to 
rising costs by not hiring more workers, or at least 
constraining the take-home pay of those they retain. 
Patients, meanwhile, negotiate a fragmented,  
confusing, and sometimes seemingly uncaring system,  
a product of accumulated accident and unintended 
consequences rather than design. Systems built 
around the assumptions of the 1950s and 1960s, 
when general practitioners could cope with most 
health needs, and file cabinets and postage stamps 
were the main methods of storing and transmitting 
data, creak and strain in the age of email, the cloud, 
and increasingly regulatory complexity. 
 No wonder, then, that health care also receives 
so much attention. Nonetheless, given its importance, 
the subject deserves more thoughtful scrutiny and 
practical recommendations. With these objectives in 
mind, the Kauffman Foundation, whose primary  
mission is to promote entrepreneurship and  
innovation throughout the economy, convened  
this Task Force on Innovation in Health Care. 
 We are well aware that there is no dearth  
of reports and recommendations for health care  
reform. Why another? In a crowded field, this  
report seeks to accomplish something different.
 First, our task force’s composition is  
unconventional, drawn from experts in a wide  
range of related, but different, fields: health care  
regulation, drug development, data sharing, medical 
specialties as different as cardiac surgery and  
veterinary medicine, and the policy sciences. The 
members have affiliations in academia, industry,  
nonprofit groups, health organization executive  
suites, medical clinics, labs, and law.1 
 Second, given the makeup of the Task Force, it 
should not be surprising that this report tackles the 
vexing problem of health care value and productivity 
introduction and executive Summary
This report addresses a deceptively simple question: How can the productivity of 
American health care be substantially improved? Productivity, in lay terms, is the ratio 
of output to inputs. A more colloquial rendition of the question might be: how can 
we get a lot more bang for our health care buck?
1  We rely on this collective expertise by, on occasion in this document, reporting a statistic or measure provided by one or more of our panel members.
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from some angles different than those typically found 
in reports or studies in this policy area. 
 This report represents the distillation of the  
collective wisdom of the Task Force members. They 
were not asked to support every suggestion or idea 
put forth here or to approve the precise wording of 
this entire report; requiring unanimity would have 
ruled out too many good ideas. Instead, we present 
here a “sense of the room” as to which approaches 
hold the most promise (and which are overrated) and 
what the basic choices are. Despite our multiplicity of 
perspectives, we found many points of intersection.
 We canvassed what we call the adjacent  
possible—that is, incremental, but important,  
workable reforms that should improve the productivity 
of health care and its value independent of whether 
and how the recently enacted Affordable Care Act  
of 2010 is ultimately implemented.2  We did not seek 
giant, dramatic steps; we avoided sweeping claims 
and rejected purported magic bullets. We believe  
that a quest for sweeping, comprehensive, one-shot 
reform is problematic because it misconceives the 
health care system as an engineered “system” rather 
than a natural ecosystem, perhaps as intricate and 
complex as anything to be found in nature.
 Instead, we focus primarily on incremental  
changes which, taken together, can cumulate to  
significantly advance both productivity of health  
care and its outcomes. These reforms build on or  
accelerate changes whose implementation runs with, 
not against, the grain of the health system’s existing 
stakeholders and structures. We thus sought to avoid 
measures requiring massive new expenditures. Some 
of the regulatory or structural changes we recommend 
would gore established interests’ oxen. But they have 
in common the virtue that, as the saying goes, you 
can get there from here. 
 Finally, we have chosen measures for their  
exemplary value, as well as for their intrinsic  
merits. They point toward a promising general  
strategy: releasing and putting to work resources  
that, for whatever reason, the current system has 
locked up. Japanese automakers’ leap forward in  
productivity came, in the main, not from technological 
breakthroughs unavailable to Detroit or from  
out-investing Detroit, but from better use of existing 
resources: freeing up the knowledge of assembly-line 
workers, implementing real-time quality controls,  
reorganizing and streamlining supply chains, and  
putting the customer at the center of the system. 
In that sense, the Japanese automakers unlocked a 
leaner, more productive, more modern form within 
the confines of an older system.
 In much the same way, we propose the  
“jail-breaking” of health care. Our health care  
system is rife with opportunities to improve  
productivity by using existing resources better— 
resources that include not just money, but the talent, 
organizational skill, and knowledge of practitioners, 
providers, researchers, and (especially, in our view)  
patients. Much as the cheapest and often fastest 
source of new energy is the more efficient use of old 
energy, so the cheapest and fastest road to a more 
productive health system is to put untapped value  
to work.
2  We borrow the term “adjacent possible” from Steven Johnson, who coined it. See Steven Johnson. Where Good Ideas Come From: A History of 
Innovation (Riverhead Trade, 2011, reprint edition). 
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 Localism is another common thread running
through many of our suggestions. Although  
cross-cutting changes to policy or regulation  
sometimes are needed, too much time and energy are 
focused on top-down, Washington-directed reforms. 
This is true especially now, as the new Affordable Care 
Act (ACA) effectively has exhausted, for the time  
being, the country’s capacity for sweeping change  
at the federal level. Particularly while the ACA is being 
digested, implemented, and perhaps modified, most 
effective change will be locally designed or adapted to 
local conditions, often varying from region to region, 
provider to provider, and even patient to patient.
 What we can generalize, however, are changes  
in incentives that help identify and propagate  
productivity improvements. Much as a hydrologist  
uses general principles of geology and fluid  
dynamics to understand where to build or to remove 
dams or levees to change flows through a larger  
system, so understanding and using incentives  
better can point the way toward health productivity 
improvements tailored to particular regions, providers, 
and patient populations.
 By design, we have brought together a varied 
assortment of ideas and suggestions, illustrating the 
messy, grab-bag nature that effective changes often 
need to take. Yet our proposals do fall (albeit with 
some overlap) into four broad categories, which  
structure the recommendations section of this report. 
Our specific policy recommendations are summarized 
in the table at the end of this Introduction.
n   Harnessing information: how systematically 
gathering and sharing data can unlock knowledge 
that produces systematically better choices. The 
key here is to incentivize a new corps of data  
entrepreneurs to collect and analyze existing  
medical data to discover and then disseminate  
the use of new therapies. 
n   Improving research: encouraging more  
collaboration across institutions and funding more 
translational research (aimed at “translating” basic 
scientific discoveries into medicines and therapies).
n   Legal and regulatory reform: modernizing 
medical malpractice systems, removing  
counter-productive restrictions on health insurance  
premiums, and streamlining new drug approvals. 
n   Empowering patients: there are large  
benefits of giving more power to the people  
who matter most—patients—to make informed 
decisions about their own care. 
 The ideas here are not new, though many of 
them are familiar only to the cognoscenti. To the 
contrary, we have sought ideas that have showed 
promise in the field, and then attempted to set them 
in a context that exploits the adjacent possible.
 If this report can focus more minds in the health 
policy community and general public on finding and 
implementing those changes, in everything from  
clinical practices to regulatory structures, it will  
have succeeded.
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 Portable consent
 
  
  Data from outside  
the health care system
  
  Sharing publicly  
funded data
 
 Curating data
Data recommendations
  Allow patients and  
research subjects in  
studies to give their  
consent for their health 
data to be included in 
large research databases.
 
  Circumvent the health 
care system, which is not 
designed for the collection 
of data, and legal privacy 
concerns by collecting 
health data outside the 
medical system.
  Similar to how the  
National Institutes of 
Health already requires  
the sharing of research 
funded by the federal 
government, data  
developed from federal 
grants also should be  
publicly available.
  As more data becomes 
available, the need for 
interoperability and ease 
of using the data becomes 
even more important.
  The government should permit patients  
the right to let whomever they choose 
access their medical records efficiently 
and easily. The Department of Health and 
Human Services could provide regulatory 
assurance that there will be no punitive  
action against experimental pilot projects 
to pool health data. If HHS does not  
believe it has this authority, it should  
request it from Congress.
  The thousands of nonprofit  
organizations actively involved in  
studying diseases should partner to  
build a national health database.  
Employers should include as part of  
health benefits packages information  
on how employees can contribute their 
health data. 
  The National Institutes of Health could 
more strictly enforce existing rules and 
otherwise require that federally funded 
data be shared, and that all grants require 
data-sharing plans. Follow-on NIH funding 
could be conditioned on data making it to 
the public domain and being re-used.
  Research grants could include some  
funding for data scrubbing, whether  
performed by the original researchers  
or by outside experts. The federal  
government or a nonprofit organization 
also could take the lead in developing 
computer programming scripts that could 
automatically re-compile data into a  
standardized, accepted format.
Policy 
Recommendation DeploymentDescription
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 Life certificate   Birth and death certificates 
already exist. The “life 
certificate” is a bundle 
of standardized health 
information that would 
travel with consumers and 
accumulate as they pass 
through health-related 
gateways: vaccinations, 
procedures, medications, 
family history, and so on.
  The federal government should fund  
research and development of the life  
certificate concept. 
Policy 
Recommendation DeploymentDescription
research recommendations
 Teams for research
 
  Encouraging translational 
research
  Break down the isolation 
of researchers and  
encourage collaborative, 
crosscutting research 
by creating teams of 
researchers from across 
multiple institutions.
  Efforts to encourage 
translational efforts, such 
as the National Center for 
Advancing Translational 
Sciences at NIH, should  
be strengthened and  
accelerated.
  The National Institutes of Health could  
condition a portion of its R01 and other 
grants on being awarded to teams of  
researchers, with larger average grants 
made available to larger teams.
  Translational research should be viewed  
as a discipline in its own right, supported 
by funding models that encourage  
interdisciplinary, applied research and  
nourished by a stream of researchers 
trained specifically in college for  
translation.
Policy 
Recommendation DeploymentDescription
Data recommendations—continued
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  Conducting comparative 
effectiveness research (CER)
research recommendations—continued
 
  The 2009 stimulus bill 
and 2010 Affordable Care 
Act both provide for the 
federal government to 
both fund and become 
more directly involved in 
conducting CER, studies 
that compare the  
effectiveness of new  
drugs and treatments 
against existing options.
 
  Comparative effectiveness research  
should be pursued in both the private  
and public sectors. While public good  
considerations favor public sector  
involvement, policymakers also should 
recognize that the federal government  
can have out-sized impacts on private  
sector practices potentially before  
definitive results are in and innovations 
have a chance to prove themselves.
  Efficiency research on the delivery  
system deserves the same level of attention 
from federal funding as research on new 
treatments; whether that effort should 
be located within NIH, in HHS’s Agency 
for Healthcare Research and Quality, or in 
some new center or institute is a subject of 
debate. Employers can and should demand 
that providers do a better job of tracking 
efficiency and subject health care costs to 
the same kinds of negotiations with  
vendors as are other expenses and inputs. 
The government should report Medicare 
data with a lag of weeks or months, and 
the cost to receive it should be reduced.
  Efforts to promote patient-centric  
Value-driven Engineering should be  
expanded. VdE holds promise for  
streamlining the development of new 
drugs and the delivery of health care, with 
better results for patients at lower cost. 
Policy 
Recommendation DeploymentDescription
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  Options for malpractice 
reform
  Reform the “Medical  
Loss Ratio” Rule
  Consider QALY
 
legal and regulatory reform recommendations
  Malpractice reform has 
long been on the health 
system’s agenda and is far 
past due. Patients, jurors, 
and judges involved in 
malpractice lawsuits  
generally lack the  
expertise to evaluate  
medical decision-making, 
the incentive to do so  
with detachment, or both. 
  The Affordable Care Act 
dictates that every health 
insurer must spend at least 
80 percent to 85 percent 
of premiums on medical 
care (payouts as a share  
of total premiums). This 
rule gives no incentive 
for insurers to reduce 
overhead beyond minimal 
requirements.
  A “quality-adjusted life 
year” is a concept used  
by health care analysts to 
examine benefits versus 
cost tradeoffs in health 
care treatment. QALY is  
a key consideration in 
reducing low-value care. 
  A “no fault” system that sets up a  
compensation system outside of the 
courts, with expert evaluators providing 
payments based on fee schedules is  
one approach. A second approach is  
to change liability rules by capping  
noneconomic damages and eliminating 
punitive damages. A third option is to 
channel medical malpractice claims into 
special “health courts” where the  
decision-makers are former or retired  
physicians or other medical experts. The 
Affordable Care Act has taken the first 
step by encouraging pilot projects for 
health courts at the state level.
  Eliminate the medical loss ratio mandate. 
A second-best option would be to expand 
MLR to make greater allowance for profit. 
  Overturn the ban from the Patient  
Protection and Affordable Care Act that 
bars the government from developing 
guidelines or policies based on QALYs.
Policy 
Recommendation DeploymentDescription
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  Encourage diagnostics
  Interim approval for new 
drugs and devices
legal and regulatory reform recommendations—continued
  Diagnostic tests are a 
largely underutilized form 
of preventive medicine. 
The medical research 
system, public and private, 
should invest more in 
diagnostics relative to 
treatments.
  Clinical trials can only 
go so far in establishing 
the safety of new drugs 
and devices. A post-trial 
“interim” approval stage 
would provide a good  
balance between safety 
and bringing new drugs 
and devices to market 
faster.
  Medicare and other government programs 
should make a definitive decision on  
reimbursing most diagnostic procedures, 
and the Food and Drug Administration 
should make a definitive decision on 
whether diagnostics will be regulated.  
Resolving this uncertainty would give 
an economic incentive for commercial 
researchers to develop and clinicians to 
adopt them.
  The FDA could establish an interim  
approval stage for new drugs and devices. 
During this phase, the new drug or device 
would be released only to physicians  
who have been trained to handle it and 
monitor the results. Developers would 
receive protection from legal liability during 
the probationary period; a share of sales  
proceeds could be set aside for a fund to 
pay for compensatory care for patients 
with bad reactions. 
Policy 
Recommendation DeploymentDescription
Patient involvement recommendations
  Promote shared  
decision-making
  Shared decision-making 
refers to the practice of a 
physician advising patients 
on their options, laying 
out pros and cons for a 
procedure, and helping 
patients understand and 
make choices about the 
kind of treatment they 
receive. Some states have 
experimented with  
measures to promote 
shared decision-making.
  Policy should strive to move shared 
decision-making through the experimental 
stage and toward broader adoption. The 
government’s new Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Innovation (created by the 
Affordable Care Act) should make a point 
of funding pilot programs in every state; 
state legislatures should revise laws to 
make shared decision-making the gold 
standard of informed consent.
Policy 
Recommendation DeploymentDescription
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 Expanding Accountable 
  Care Organizations
  Focus physicians in acute 
and integrative care; allow 
others to take charge of 
wellness and integrative 
care.
  Reducing over-capacity  
and over-use
  Developing electronic  
medical records (EMRs)
Organization and Delivery reform recommendations
  The Affordable Care Act 
seeks to promote ACOs, 
networks of providers 
that are accountable for 
and reimbursed based on 
patient outcomes.
  Health care can largely 
be categorized into four 
kinds of care—acute, 
chronic, wellness, and 
integrative. Chronic and 
wellness care mostly are 
routine and do not need 
high-priced physicians to 
actively manage them.
  Use Medicare’s payment 
leverage to encourage 
more focus on high-value 
care.
  The health care  
industry lags behind  
other sectors in the  
adoption and integration 
of information  
technologies. EMRs are 
viewed by many as the 
next big step in bringing 
health care to the modern 
technological age.
  Policymakers of both parties should 
continue the ACO and Accountable Care 
Community (ACC) experiments for a  
sufficiently long period to assess whether 
their promise is fulfilled.
  Reform state licensing restrictions to  
allow nurse practitioners and other  
non-physicians to do more with respect 
to chronic and wellness care, and change 
Medicare rules to allow reimbursement 
for more treatments performed by nurse 
practitioners.
  Medicare should not pay to use drugs  
in ways the FDA deems ineffective,  
nor support treatments regarded as  
inappropriate by standard guidelines. 
  The development of EMRs should focus 
on improving service—reducing repetitive 
patient paperwork and integrating  
billing and other back-office processes 
with medical functions; it is unlikely that 
EMRs will contain the sort of information 
that will be useful for research, nor are 
EMRs likely to be a “silver bullet” answer 
to cost problems.
Policy 
Recommendation DeploymentDescription
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a record of innovation
 If the United States had accomplished  
nothing else in the past hundred years, it would be 
remembered in history for its extraordinary record of 
medical innovation. In a century of staggeringly  
rapid improvements in medical knowledge and  
technology throughout the West and Asia, the  
United States towers over others. Odd though it  
may seem, at the dawn of the twentieth century,  
the United States was a medical backwater  
relative to Europe; but the second half of the century 
saw a remarkable flowering of science, technology, 
and innovation, supported and driven by the world’s 
largest economy and the world’s greatest scientific 
and academic infrastructure. One might say, without 
undue fear of exaggeration and despite the current 
angst over health care cost and quality in the United 
States, as the Italy of the High Renaissance is to art,  
so America of the past sixty or so years has been to 
medicine.
 Benefits from these advances have been valued 
in the trillions of dollars and have led to a consistently 
higher quality of life for people all over the world. 
Quantity of life has improved, too. Health care  
advances have contributed—along with improvements 
in living standards, safer workplaces and childhood 
vaccinations—to an increase in life expectancy at 
birth, which for Americans rose from forty-seven in 
1900 to seventy-seven in 2000 (an astonishing gain 
of 110 days per year or two days per week during the 
twentieth century).3 One reason for this remarkable 
improvement is the dramatic drop in infant mortality 
of more than 90 percent (coupled with the 99-plus 
percent decline in maternal mortality) over the  
century. In addition, the two decades from 1930 
through 1949 alone, a period including the Great  
Depression, remarkably saw the introduction of  
electrolyte therapy and use of antibiotics,  
accompanied by a 52 percent drop in infant mortality.4 
Chapter One
Contours of the problem
3 National Vital Statistics 59(1): 33–34, Table 12 (June 28, 2010).
4 CDC, MMWR Report 48(38): 849–858 (October 1, 1999).
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 Gains in both general wellness and in treatments 
and cures for specific diseases have generated large 
welfare gains. Although those gains cannot, of course, 
be fully assessed in terms of dollars, their economic 
value is impressive nonetheless. Kevin Murphy and 
Robert Topel estimate that, from 1970 to 2000,  
national wealth increased by $3.2 trillion per year  
and cumulatively (in present discounted value) by 
more than $95 trillion total (about half of GDP) 
through increases in longevity.5 For heart disease 
alone, reduced mortality contributed roughly  
$1.5 trillion per year to the value of life since  
1970.6 William Nordhaus estimates that increases  
in longevity have been as valuable as all other  
sources of economic growth combined.7  
 Generating many of these medical improvements 
have been substantial investments in research and 
development. To spur medical innovation, the United 
States funds (publicly and privately) more than $60 
billion per year in medical research.8 Real spending on 
medical research increased 61 percent from 1980 to 
1995 and 23 percent from 1990 to 1995 alone.9  
The largest single health research agency is the  
National Institutes of Health (NIH), whose annual  
appropriations rose by more than 4,000-fold in  
inflation-adjusted dollars, from $700,000 going into 
World War II to $30 billion in 2010.10 Even compared 
to other developed countries, the United States 
poured a large amount of funding into such research. 
In 2000, for example, countries that make up the 
European Union devoted just $3.7 billion to medical 
research for a population that was 25 percent larger. 
As the chart shows, the United States, by itself,  
accounted in 2005 for roughly half the world’s  
annual health R&D expenditures.11 
5 Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel, “The Value of Health and Longevity,” Journal of Political Economy 114, no. 5, (2006): 871–904.
6 Ibid.
7  William D. Nordhaus, “Health of Nations: The Contribution of Improved Health to Living Standards,” in Measuring Gains from Medical  
Research: An Economic Approach, ed. Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) 9–40.
8  Forty percent of this amount comes from the federal government. Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel, “The Value of Health and Longevity,” 
Journal of Political Economy 114, no. 5, (2006): 871–904.
9  Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel, “The Economic Value of Medical Research,” in Measuring Gains from Medical Research: An Economic 
Approach, ed. Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) 41–73.
10 See Chart of NIH appropriations adjusted by OMB price deflator. 
11  Mary Anne Burke and Jean-Jacques Monot, “Global financing and flows,” in Mary Anne Burke and Stephen A. Matlin, eds., Monitoring 
Resource Flows for Health Research 2008 (Geneva, CH: Global Forum for Health Research), p. 29 and Fig. 2.3.
Sources: Global Forums for Health Research estimates based on official data from 
official reports to OECD and RICYT, national surveys, pharmaceutical associations, 
and other publications.
United States 50%
 China (with Taiwan) 1%
 Netherlands 1%
          Denmark 1%
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             France 5%
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Germany 6%
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The Price of Progress
 No one would deny the importance and  
beneficence of medical progress, other things being 
equal. And few ordinary Americans like to entertain 
the question of, for example, how much an extra year 
of life is worth; most people esteem the value of life 
as infinite. Policymakers cannot afford to think that 
way, however. They are required to ask, as in every 
other area of life, not just whether something good 
happened as a result of a dollar spent, but whether 
that dollar might have been better spent elsewhere—
the concept of opportunity cost, as economists call it. 
If a dollar spent on cleaning up the water supply can 
prevent as many deaths as hundreds of dollars spent 
on hospital beds, then, in a world of limited resources, 
sewage treatment is the better investment. In the 
United States, medical progress has been paired with 
ever-increasing expenditure on health care, leading 
many to question whether such expenditures and  
their allocation are worthwhile investments in the  
first place.
 In principle, medical research spending should 
generate huge payoffs. For example, Murphy and  
Topel estimate that a 1 percent decline in cancer  
mortality would be worth about $500 billion, which 
implies that an additional $100 billion in research 
would be worthwhile even if there were only a  
one-in-five chance that such spending would lead to 
that 1 percent reduction in mortality. Whether  
medical research funding—especially by the federal 
government—is leading to optimal results, however,  
is another matter. There is reason to believe it is not.
 The large investments in medical R&D have been 
accompanied by even larger and more rapidly growing 
national health care expenditures, as the chart above 
indicates. Between 1960 and 1998, per capita real 
spending on health care went up by 4.9 percent per 
household, while wages only increased 2 percent.12  
In the first decade of the present century, the  
situation grew, if anything, even worse. According to 
the Bureau of Labor Statistics, the inflation-adjusted  
average hourly compensation of American workers 
—that is, the value of workers’ total pay packages, 
including health insurance and other employer- 
provided benefits—grew by 1.3 percent a year from 
2000 to 2009. By postwar standards, even that rate of 
growth would be counted by most as disappointing. 
Greatly compounding the sting of slow growth,  
however, has been that less than half of the increase 
in real compensation (including benefits) has flowed 
through to workers’ average wages and salaries (their 
paychecks), with the remainder (0.7 percentage points 
per year) being siphoned off by rising health insurance 
costs.13 One way to think of this is the rising costs of 
health care exact a painfully escalating health care tax 
on a hard-pressed workforce. And yet, adding insult to 
injury, the growing hit to paychecks has not reduced 
personal spending on health care: in 1960, the  
average person spent $700 on health care, but by 
2006 that number had grown to $6,000, while the 
ratio of health spending to GDP had tripled.14 Directly 
and indirectly, Americans are paying more for health 
care—and more, and more.
Inflation-adjusted NHE
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12  Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel, “The Economic Value of Medical Research,” in Measuring Gains from Medical Research: An Economic 
Approach, ed. Kevin M. Murphy and Robert H. Topel (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2003) 41–73.
13  http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2010/03/12/exploring-link-between-rising-health-insurance-premiums-and-stagnant-wages, accessed July 
29, 2011.
14  David Cutler, Allison B. Rosen, and Sandeep Vijan, “Value of Medical Innovation in the United States: 1960–2000,” New England Journal of 
Medicine 355, no. 9 (2006): 920–927.
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 Many countries face their own versions of a 
health care cost crisis, but the United States,  
unfortunately, leads the way. Compared to other 
countries, the United States spends much more than 
similar economies do. In 2006, 15 percent of the 
United States’ GDP was spent on health care,  
compared with 11 percent in France and Germany, 
and 10 percent in the United Kingdom and Japan.15 
  Rapidly escalating health care costs are also at the 
heart of the long-term structural deficits of the state 
and federal governments. At the federal level alone, 
Medicare and Medicaid spending represented 5.3  
percent of GDP in 2009,16 and unless the benefit 
structures in these programs are changed, their  
combined costs should reach 11 percent by 2035  
and keep rising thereafter.17 Clearly, this “excess” 
health care growth—the amount by which health care 
costs grow faster than GDP—is unsustainable in the 
long run. As is now widely recognized, the cost trends 
in health care—consistently increasing at roughly  
2.5 percentage points faster than the general rate of 
inflation—cannot continue forever, and perhaps not 
even for much longer. 
 Finally, to make matters even worse, the huge 
United States government-funded research effort is 
not delivering the best bang for the buck, either.  
By one measure, research productivity has dropped 
noticeably over time: despite a major increase in 
federal funding for the National Institutes of Health 
between 1993 and 2010, the number of new  
FDA-approved drugs dropped from more than fifty  
in 1996 to just twenty-one in 2010.18  
Drivers of Cost
 Why the rapid cost growth? Partly for “good” 
reasons; that is, because of changes that either  
are desirable or inevitable. One factor is that the 
population is getting older as people live longer.  
Longer lives are desirable, and no one wants to  
shorten them; but, in medical terms, added years 
toward the end of life are expensive. Moreover, the 
country has grown richer, and wealthier people spend 
more on health care—a perfectly reasonable choice 
for them to make, at least if the choice is based on 
sound information and is guided and constrained by 
accurate market signals.19 Where the market functions 
efficiently, rising discretionary expenditures efficiently 
reflect changing preferences.
 Unfortunately, no one seriously disputes  
that health care markets are far from efficient. A  
combination of insufficient information, poor  
incentives for cost control (indeed, the very opposite) 
created by third-party insurance (both private and 
public), and inefficiencies in health care research—all 
of those factors have led to much waste.20 By one  
estimate, of the $2.5 trillion spent on health care in 
the United States in 2010, $700 billion was not  
necessary.21 
15  Alan M. Garber and Jonathan Skinner, “Is American Health Care Uniquely Inefficient?” Journal of Economic Perspectives 22, no. 4 (September 
2008): 27–50.
16  Carmen Reinhardt and Kenneth Rogoff, This Time is Different: Eight Centuries of Financial Folly (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2009).
17  Congressional Budget Office, “The Long-Term Budget Outlook.” Congress of the United States, November 2010. 
18  For NIH appropriations, see http://www.nih.gov/about/almanac/appropriations/part2.htm. For new drug approval, defined as New Molecular  
Entities and New Biological Agents, see the historical data at http://www.fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDe-
velopedandApproved/DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/UCM123959.pdf and the most recent fully completed calendar year 2010 and http://www.
fda.gov/downloads/Drugs/DevelopmentApprovalProcess/HowDrugsareDevelopedandApproved/DrugandBiologicApprovalReports/UCM242677.pdf.
19  Cutler, et al., 2006, Cutler 2004, Murphy and Topel 2006, Hall and Jones 2007. 
20  See Amitabh Chandra and Jonathan S. Skinner, “Technology and Expenditure Growth in Health Care,” (National Bureau of Economic Research, 
Cambridge, 2009) and David Cutler, “Where Are the Health Care Entrepreneurs? The Failure of Organization Innovation in Health Care,” (Working 
Paper 16030, National Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 2010).
21  David Cutler, “Where Are the Health Care Entrepreneurs? The Failure of Organization Innovation in Health Care,” (Working Paper 16030, National 
Bureau of Economic Research, Cambridge, 2010).
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 An important reason for the inefficiency—some 
experts argue it is the most important reason—is that, 
with the tax incentives employers and employees have 
to purchase excessive, and excessively costly, health 
care insurance, all health care providers thus have 
incentives to provide increasingly expensive health  
care products and services. Now, the widespread  
availability of health insurance is, without doubt, a 
good thing. In an era when critical medical  
intervention often involves complex and ruinously  
expensive procedures undreamt of several decades 
ago, few Americans would question the value— 
indeed, often the indispensability—of insurance  
coverage for non-routine health care costs, or the 
medical equivalent of major car accidents or natural 
catastrophes. Creating a hybrid public-private health 
insurance infrastructure was one of the great  
social-policy achievements of the postwar era. But 
most Americans with private insurance get it through 
their employers, so they have little incentive or ability 
to shop around—indeed, they have every reason to 
press their employers for a Cadillac health plan instead 
of a Chevrolet that covers virtually all health care 
spending, minus a modest annual deductible and  
per-physician deductible. Each member of the  
chain—patient, provider, insurer—feels comfortable  
offloading higher costs onto the next, so crucial  
trade-offs are never made.
 With costs hidden by insurance from ultimate 
consumers, and with the public insatiably hungry for 
new high-tech elixirs, health care innovation to date 
in the United States has been largely cost-enhancing. 
Gone are the days when physicians would be careful 
about ordering tests or diagnostics. To the contrary, 
today, doctors routinely order an x-ray (or many  
x-rays), or frequently an MRI or CT scan, before even 
attempting a diagnosis and treatment. They are  
heavily influenced by the knowledge that their  
patients’ insurance will pay for the procedures, a 
knowledge compounded by fear of a malpractice 
lawsuit if some patients suffer a major misfortune and 
not every test had been ordered. Moreover, ordering 
the test helps the hospital or clinic that bought  
the machine recoup its investment and covers the 
salaries of the folks in the radiology department.  
The test does, of course, sometimes produce useful  
information, even if only in some cases and at the 
margin, or if it only corroborates a clinical impression.
More Knowledge, Better Incentives
 As we hope the discussion so far brings home, 
the knots in the U.S. health care system would be 
comparatively easy to untie if they all were the result 
of purely irrational flaws or historical flukes. Some 
undoubtedly are; the linkage of health insurance 
to employment, for example, arose as a result of a 
quirk in the tax code, but its persistence today causes 
pervasive economic distortions and leaves millions of 
Americans stranded without health insurance when 
they lose their jobs and thus are at their most  
vulnerable. 
 But the central problem is that many of health 
care’s problems, to the contrary, are byproducts  
not of the system’s flaws but of its virtues. That is  
why we reject the quest for magic bullets, whether  
in the form of single-payer national insurance, at one 
extreme, or at the other, by getting the government 
out of subsidizing care, even solely by vouchers.  
Whatever the merits or shortcomings of either of 
those approaches, neither can change the fact that 
any innovation that helps people live longer and 
higher-quality lives will tend to increase the  
consumption of care by ensuring that more people 
are around to consume it; any system that provides 
the security of insurance will insulate consumers from 
many of the costs of their health care choices; and any 
breakthrough in treatment of a medical condition is 
likely to make people more complacent about  
prevention. 
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 Our approach, then, is to accept the inevitability 
of tradeoffs and second-best outcomes while looking 
for ways to better design incentives. Fortunately, there 
is plenty of room for improvement, even recognizing 
the complexity of the innovation ecosystem for health 
care and health-related technologies, the elusiveness 
of causal networks, and the fact that medical  
spending and technology often are highly beneficial. 
Today’s health care system provides insufficient  
incentives to develop and use lower-cost,  
higher-return technologies instead of higher-cost, 
lower-return ones. 
 For example: today’s incentives seem to  
induce creation of very high-cost, incremental  
improvements (think Avastin® for cancer care)  
that financially reward those who develop and  
commercialize the innovations, but provide little 
improvement in health outcomes and relatively weak 
incentives to stop smoking, get exercise, and eat right, 
or to invest in health information systems that might 
increase system efficiency. How could we get cheaper 
cancer therapies and more polio vaccines, rather than 
innovations of relatively little incremental benefit? 
How can we better harness patients’ own immune 
systems to prevent and treat disease, rather than  
relying on devices and drugs to do these jobs? The 
need for answers intensifies as the wave of baby 
boomers becomes eligible for Medicare and costs  
continue to rise for both Medicare and Medicaid.
 Building a cost-effective health care system of the 
future can and should be done in layers—just as is 
done in technical networks—to allow the separation 
of concerns in such a way that it is possible to  
experiment in new layers while continuing to rein in 
costs in the existing ones. If the experiments pay off, 
they can be integrated, rather than ripping out the 
existing system for something entirely untested. 
 In our view, too many of the changes under  
public discussion would move money around in the 
system without revising the underlying incentives or 
gathering the knowledge that determines how  
efficiently the money is spent. We are struck that the 
state of the debate seems to be something like, on  
the one hand, “If you want more cures, let drug  
companies make more money” (by extending the  
life of drug patents, for example, and developing  
me-too drugs); and, on the other hand, “If you want 
to reduce costs, reduce government spending” (by 
limiting federal liability or simply cutting entitlements 
and assuming that the system will adjust to lower  
payment). Instead, we propose measures that  
introduce new efficiency-driving information into  
the system, reduce wasted motion, or both.
 The Centers for Medicare and Medicaid  
Services now administer almost $900 billion a year in 
spending;22 add another hundred billion or so for the 
VA, military health systems, the Indian Health Service, 
and the Federal Employee Health Benefits Plan, and 
we are at more than $1 trillion federal dollars spent on 
health goods and services every year—about the same 
as the United Kingdom’s entire government budget 
(including the National Health Service).23 Add another 
trillion or so on health care spending in the private 
sector, overwhelmingly reimbursed by private insurers. 
This complex aggregate we know as the “U.S. health 
care system” is a huge and complicated organism 
that takes in huge amounts of dollars and generates 
immeasurable amounts of information. But what do 
we currently do with all the data created? Without an 
infrastructure to support it, all this information goes 
to waste. The next chapter speaks to how to leverage 
this information to combat inefficiencies in our health 
care system and improve patient outcomes.
22  In 2009, combined Medicare and Medicaid Services’ national health expenditures were roughly $867 billion, as reported by the Centers for 
Medicare & Medicaid Services, Office of the Actuary, National Health Statistics Group, https://www.cms.gov/NationalHealthExpendData/down-
loads/tables.pdf.
23  Total U.K. public spending was about £632 billion in 2010–2011, or just over $1 trillion in July 2011. Data: http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/d/
pesa_2011_tables_chapter4.xlsx (downloaded from http://www.hm-treasury.gov.uk/pespub_pesa11.htm).
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Chapter tWO
Unlocking and Unleashing 
the power of information
 Conventional wisdom holds that modern  
information management holds great untapped  
potential for health care quality improvements  
and cost savings. This is an instance where the  
conventional wisdom is right. Less widely understood, 
however, especially among the general public, is 
where that potential lies. The answer is: not in  
doctors’ offices, nor in hospitals.
 When most Americans think about “health care 
IT” (health care information technology), they think 
about electronic medical records. And well they 
should. Medical record-keeping in the United States  
is, in general, pitiably obsolete, with records still 
scrawled on paper charts and stored in file drawers 
and cubbyholes, as they were a century ago.  
Correcting this problem holds promise of dramatically 
improving the experience of the health care customer, 
and also promises to reduce back-office inefficiency—
points we will return to later in this report.
 Creating a more seamless consumer experience 
and a more efficient back office, however, merely 
scratches the surface of what can be done with 
information technology—and the key is not so much 
the technology as the information. An information 
revolution now is taking place in retailing via Amazon, 
entertainment via Netflix, and targeted advertising via 
Google and Facebook, among many other examples. 
Digital merchants, social networks, and data  
mining entrepreneurs are assembling countless bits 
and bytes of information about consumer preferences, 
transactions, and outcomes, agglomerating them, 
and creating algorithms that can predict what people 
need, help them find it, and deliver it efficiently. Every 
day, millions upon millions of grocery store purchases 
and reward card scans generate electronic records that 
pour into databases, telling retailers and  
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distributors who their customers are, what customers 
want more of, what kinds of promotions work, and 
where inventories are tight. Yet virtually none of these 
tools is in use in medicine, where it could work far 
greater wonders than in retailing.
 For instance, about 70 percent to 80 percent of 
women who develop breast cancer do not have a 
first-degree-relative family history of the disease, so 
clearly non-genetic factors must be at work.24 As one 
clinician puts it, “We’re missing something big.” Or, 
perhaps more accurately, we’re missing much that 
is small. The country faces more than 200,000 new 
breast cancer cases every year, each treated as  
individual cases, or a few occasionally bundled  
together for research purposes. Studies can compare 
selected patient populations in detail on a small scale, 
and they can make gross comparisons on a large 
scale. But the factor or factors that cause those 70 
percent to 80 percent of unpredictable breast cancer 
cases are, as of today, falling through the cracks,  
invisible to the crude optics of the health care sector’s 
data systems. 
 Instead, imagine a world in which breast cancer 
cases, their courses of treatment, and their outcomes 
were routinely uploaded to a database. Another river 
of data would flow in from women who have not 
had breast cancer. Pattern analysis could search and 
compare many thousands of cases across hundreds of 
variables for clues as to which factors increase or  
decrease risk of disease, which methods most  
effectively and safely extend life, which do so at the 
lowest cost relative to years gained, which treatments 
produce highest patient satisfaction, and, no less  
important, which therapies are not cost-effective.  
In principle, with proper privacy safeguards,  
medical data could be cross-referenced with DNA  
data to uncover new targets for drug research, to 
design individualized therapies, and to tailor  
best-practice guidelines not just for whole diseases  
but for particular patients. For cancer, for example, 
doctors prescribe first-line therapies that they know 
will not work in three-fourths of patients with  
metastatic breast and colon cancer—they just  
don’t know which three-fourths.25 Combining larger 
datasets on drug response with genomic data on 
patients could steer therapies to the people they are 
most likely to help. The result would be to reduce  
substantially the need for trial-and-error medicine, 
with all its discomforts, high costs, and sometimes 
tragically wrong guesses.
 So why hasn’t all this been done? There is no 
shortage of raw information in the health care  
system. But it is locked in medical offices and hospitals 
across the country, and in the files of pharmaceutical 
companies who guard the results of their failed clinical 
trials. To become data, medical information needs 
to be collected, unlocked, converted to standardized 
formats, and then entered into databases. And to 
become knowledge, these data must be sorted and 
analyzed by information experts and their algorithms, 
teasing out hidden patterns and thereby finding 
needles in the haystacks. Finally, to become care, 
knowledge needs to be disseminated and acted upon 
by clinicians, insurers, regulators, and politicians.
24 Top Breast Cancer Myths, American Cancer Society.
25 See, e.g., Burzykowksi, et al., “Evaluation of Tumor Response, Disease Control, Progression-Free Survival, and Time to Progression as Potential   
 Surrogate End Points in Metastatic Breast Cancer,” Journal of Clinical Oncology, 2008: 26, 1987–1992.
20
Valuing Health Care: Im
proving Productivity and Q
uality
 Each of those steps poses challenges. Among the 
leading causes of resistance are:
n   Legal barriers and privacy concerns.  
Patient records are treated as confidential by  
HIPAA (the Health Insurance Portability and  
Accountability Act of 1996) and other laws, and 
for good reason. Also for good reason, medical 
ethics rules require patients to give informed  
consent before they can be treated as research 
subjects. Though well intentioned, these sorts  
of rules have a rising cost. Written in an age before 
data mining and its potential benefits were well 
understood, they introduce friction into the process 
of collecting, sharing, and analyzing data. Instead 
of balancing privacy against discovery, the current 
system puts policy’s thumb so much on the side of 
privacy that it has the practical effect of locking in 
information, restricting it to the smallest possible 
“need-to-know” circle.
n   Technical and semantic issues. Merely 
uploading information into a database is not very 
useful if the data are in a multiplicity of formats 
that cannot “talk” to each other or be easily  
compared. Nor can information be compared 
widely if semantics are not standardized; if, that 
is, different data gatherers use the same labels to 
mean different things. In the health sector, there is 
no equivalent of the domain-name standardization 
of the Internet. Some kinds of analysis, such as a 
Google search, can tease out valuable information 
merely by looking at where words appear and how 
they connect, without knowing what people think 
the words mean. In medicine, however, consistent 
conceptual categorization is particularly important.
n   Constraints on talent and expertise. In 
the financial and Internet sectors, the economic 
value of data collection and analysis is high, and 
the cost of gathering and accessing data is low. As 
a result, Wall Street and Silicon Valley are magnets 
for data-jockeying talent. In today’s health sector, 
by contrast, the economic value of data collection 
and analysis is low, and the cost of gathering and 
accessing data is high. Predictably, therefore, the 
health sector draws little data mining talent and 
offers few financial rewards with which to attract 
it; nor is data mining talent being systematically 
trained and acclimated for the health care sector. 
In effect, the cost and reward structures in health 
care send a two-word message to potential data 
entrepreneurs: “Don’t bother.” 
n   Cultural and policy resistance.  
Physicians and principal investigators usually are 
acculturated to protect and hoard information, not 
routinely share it. The default assumption is that 
information collected here stays here, unless there 
is a particular reason to move it somewhere else. 
This cultural predilection often exacerbates the 
already-restrictive effects of privacy constraints—
and privacy constraints, in turn, often excuse the 
hoarding of information. Moreover, at the policy 
level, processing and uploading information,  
where infrastructure exists to do so, is costly, and  
currently neither public programs nor private  
insurers pay for it. Moreover, if the research funder 
does not require the sharing of data, it doesn’t 
happen. Not surprisingly, people prioritize that 
which they are compensated for doing or are 
required to do. 
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 These barriers are daunting. They are aggravated 
by the fact that much information that would be of 
use in a productive health data mining effort is not 
even in an individual’s medical record, either because a 
doctor never asked for it, or because a patient would 
never even be aware of what might be useful. 
 But two considerations militate against despair. 
First, the potential payoffs of surmounting them are 
more than proportionate to the effort. The McKinsey 
Global Institute estimates that mobilizing health care 
information could yield more than $300 billion a year 
in additional value, or almost $1,000 a year for every 
person in the United States. Of these sums, at least 
two-thirds would take the form of reduced national 
spending on health care.26 If even a fraction of that 
unlocked value could be returned to providers and 
patients, they would have strong incentives to join the 
data revolution. 
 The push for “open data” is often gauzy and 
rhetoric-driven. There are some clear directions to 
take: polling patients to determine if their medicines 
work or not, and then mapping those answers to  
genetic variations to detect correlations. The results 
can help cut reimbursement costs for drugs whose  
effectiveness can be predicted, in advance, as less 
likely to work for a given patient population. This is 
simply one of many potential cost savings from  
opening up data. 
 Second, sweeping reforms are not the only way 
forward. Incremental improvements, we believe, can 
make a significant difference, because benefits of data 
sharing can begin to flow before the whole health 
care system is networked. Similar to attempts to 
overhaul technical networks, asking vendors to throw 
everything out to adopt an ostensibly “perfect” new 
system will encounter significant resistance. Adopting 
instead incremental, but open and extendable,  
approaches makes it possible to detect where the 
value emerges and to target additional investments 
there rather than to bet big and risk failure. This is 
particularly true with strategies that change incen-
tives at the health sector’s data choke points, or which 
bypass those bottlenecks altogether. 
Better Data and More of It: Reducing and 
Circumventing Obstacles
 How can data entrepreneurship be incentivized, 
rather than discouraged? Data entrepreneurs are  
analysts who, seeking profits, or knowledge, or both, 
wade into seas of data, much of which may seem 
valueless on its face, and discover innovative ways to 
mine it for new insights. Though data entrepreneurs 
are no substitute for the patient trials and controlled 
experiments that are the gold standard for clinical and 
scientific research, they can process large amounts of 
information very quickly: in days or hours, as opposed 
to years for traditional research. Perhaps more  
important, they need not know what it is they are 
looking for. In many cases, entirely unexpected  
patterns may fall out of the data. 
 The role of the data entrepreneur, then, is to 
invest time and expertise prospecting for patterns.  
Doing that, in turn, requires that the data supply be 
reasonably large and the cost of accessing and  
analyzing it be reasonably low—conditions that do not 
exist in American health care today. Indeed, the cost 
of data entrepreneurship is probably higher in health 
care than in almost any other sector of the economy. 
Many of the finest data analysts in the country, for 
example, are focused on visualization, analysis,  
26 McKinsey Global Institute, Big Data: The Next Frontier for Innovation, Competition, and Productivity, May 2011, pp. 49–50.
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interpretation, and monetization—but of data  
related to music, social media, and advertising.  
We must draw on their talents and their investors, 
and induce them to enter the health care arena by 
providing “bait” in the form of large, well-formatted, 
low-transaction-cost pipelines full of data.
 How, then, can incentives be rebalanced to  
make data entrepreneurship attractive in American 
health care? We believe that much can be done 
through a combination of reducing and circumventing 
institutional obstacles.
Consent You Carry Around
 One major obstacle is the elaborate system of 
informed consent protocols for research on human 
subjects. The kinds of safeguards that make sense  
in the context of, say, drug trials and other forms  
of research on people often are unnecessary and  
counterproductive in the context of research on data.
 In particular, patients and other research  
subjects currently are able to give their consent to  
be studied in only a single research venture or at a 
particular venue. Consent attaches to the research 
project or site, not to, as it were, the person granting 
consent. Outside the boundaries of any given study,  
or after that study is completed, further research on 
the study’s subjects is nearly always off limits. As a 
result, study populations are incredibly expensive  
to assemble, in one-off fashion, and typically  
impossible to integrate with other data collected  
by other scientists. This blocks the reuse and  
repurposing of information that is commonplace in 
other parts of the economy and society. Indeed, the 
great irony is that the health care sector is one of the 
only places where this kind of integration is prevented. 
 For an analogy, imagine that supermarkets could 
collect purchase data only for individuals who gave 
advance approval to do narrowly targeted research. 
Instead of sweeping up all your purchase data  
automatically, you and a few dozen other shoppers 
might be asked, when you entered the store, if you 
would be willing to have your produce purchases 
tracked that day. Then you might be asked to read 
and sign an off-putting consent form. Your purchasing 
behavior at other stores, or in the same store a few 
months from now, or how your produce purchases 
interact with your beverage selections—all of that 
might be beyond the purview of the study. No doubt, 
retailers could glean valuable insights from this kind of 
targeted research, but the larger flows of information 
they need to make efficient inventory decisions would 
be nearly impossible to gather.
 Retailers have discovered a better way. By opting 
in for club cards and other preferred-buyer programs, 
many shoppers give what amounts to portable  
informed consent. That is, permission to use data  
attaches to the shopper, not the study. And there  
isn’t a law that blocks it.
 Chemotherapy treatments are, of course, far  
more personally sensitive than cat food purchases.  
Yet, the same broad principle applies: an important 
step toward reducing the costs of health data  
entrepreneurship is to allow members of the public—
health care users and the general public—to  
pre-approve the anonymized use of health and  
lifestyle data about themselves for purposes of  
broad, non-individuated research.
 As of now, a well-defined legal regime for  
portable informed consent has yet to be developed, 
though there are a few projects expected to launch in 
2012. It likely will take a series of pilot programs and 
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experimentation to learn the correct balance between 
the privacy of patients, the uncertainty of the effects 
of public health research, and the technological  
capacity emerging to capture and integrate personal 
data. An important measure to move the ball forward 
could be taken right now, however: the Department 
of Health and Human Services could provide  
regulatory air cover, so to speak, for pilot projects 
by creating a safe harbor for experimentation. What 
investigators need is simply some assurance that  
learning what works will not result, later, in punitive 
action by the government. If HHS does not believe 
that it has this authority, it should request it from 
Congress. 
 It bears repeating that pre-approved informed 
consent applies to research on data, not on people. 
Rules need to take all reasonable measures to prevent 
researchers from identifying named individuals in the 
database, something that can be avoided with  
technologies that decouple data from names and 
other individuating characteristics when data are  
uploaded. Similarly, protocols need to penalize  
efforts to identify individuals and target them with 
marketing or fundraising pitches. There are currently 
no penalties with which to punish researchers who 
violate normative or contractual requests to avoid  
re-identifying patients whose detailed, but  
impersonalized, records are the basis of research. 
Health Information, Not Health Care
 Rules and technology can go a long way toward 
protecting anonymity. But they won’t be perfect. No 
technology or penalty will be sufficiently robust to  
prevent all determined data crunchers from ever  
identifying individuals. And the special sensitivities  
pertaining to information gathered by physicians  
and hospitals cannot and should not be eliminated.
 How, then, can privacy concerns specific to the 
practice of medicine be squared with the need to 
provide far more data available to enterprising (and 
sometimes nosey) data miners? An important part of 
the answer, we think, lies in circumventing a second 
obstacle: the health care delivery system itself.
 This may sound counterintuitive. Where, after all, 
could one conduct health care research except inside 
the health care system? That is where the doctors 
and patients are, it is where the care is delivered, and 
where the diagnoses and prescriptions are made. And 
it is, of course, where medical research has gone on 
until now.
 In fact, however, the health care system is in  
critical ways a particularly bad place for health care 
data collection, for several reasons. One is simply that 
it is organized for treatment, not for collecting data 
and putting it in usable forms. The forms that  
patients fill out in doctors’ offices are designed to  
help providers understand the patient’s clinical  
situation, not to build a broadly cross-referenced  
dataset including variables, such as lifestyle choices 
and family history, which may have no bearing on  
the treatment at hand. Even if the forms they have 
patients fill out were designed for easy upload, which 
of course they are not, health care providers are not 
paid or trained as data collectors.
 Another reason is that, apart from an occasional 
clinical study, the medical system gathers information 
only when people are in that system seeking care—
which is to say, when they think they are sick. A truly 
powerful dataset would turn its searchlight on the 
healthy population, helping to understand what it is 
that makes and keeps people healthy, and not merely 
what makes them sick.
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 Yet another reason, and perhaps the most  
important, is the privacy problem to which we just  
alluded. Health care providers are culturally trained 
and legally constrained to treat patient information 
with maximum sensitivity. Providers and patients alike 
have reason to be squeamish about uploading data to 
a system whose security might be breached.
 We believe current data-sharing rules within the 
medical system are more overprotective than they 
need to be. The consensus of the task force is that 
health care data, suitably anonymized, should be 
treated as a “public good”—something that  
benefits society broadly and whose benefits cannot 
be restricted to just a few. Some members of this 
task force believe policy should be changed to allow 
anonymized treatment data (for example, doctors 
might upload data linking prescriptions to treatments 
or ailments, but not to individuals) to be reported to 
databases. Whether this would be automatic unless 
patients request to opt out, or require patients to opt 
in is up for debate. The position of allowing for  
anonymous databases, however, is not a consensus 
view either within our task force or in American  
society. One potential interim step is to create safe 
harbors for sharing and redistributing anonymous 
data, which doesn’t carry names or Social Security 
numbers but still hasn’t been so de-identified that the 
data are rendered useless for research or prevent a  
secure way to re-contact the patient for enrollment 
in a clinical study or trial. Nonetheless, it probably will 
take years to prepare the medical culture and privacy 
laws such as HIPAA for thoroughgoing change. 
 An even more promising approach, we believe, 
would circumvent the problems created by medical 
records by collecting health data outside the medical 
system. The potential here is vast; literally countless 
organizations and venues can lend themselves to 
easily and enthusiastically participate in data sourcing 
efforts. The United States is host to 2,000 or more 
nonprofit organizations that actively study and fight 
diseases. Many of them would be natural partners in 
an enterprising effort to build a national health  
database. Employers could provide another nexus, 
dispensing information for employees interested in 
contributing to the understanding of disease and 
wellness. This is more about observation of outcomes 
“in the wild” than about the controlled, double-blind 
studies that have formed the bedrock of clinical  
practice for decades. 
 A current, highly successful example of collecting 
data outside the health care system is provided by the 
Army of Women, which is putting into practice the 
scenario with which we began this chapter. Sponsored 
by the Dr. Susan Love Research Foundation and the 
Avon Foundation for Women, this project has since 
2008 signed up over 350,000 women (out of a goal 
of 1 million) to volunteer to participate in breast  
cancer research; it then matches volunteers with 
studies, sometimes quickly enough to populate entire 
studies in a day or two. By contract, researchers agree 
to share the data they develop with the Army of 
Women, which thereby accumulates an ever-growing 
database. Significantly, four-fifths of the women in the 
Army’s volunteer pool are not current or former breast 
cancer patients. It is, indeed, an army of women, not 
an army of patients.
 There are many advantages to collecting health 
data outside the medical arena. Dedicated operations 
are optimized for collecting data instead of treating 
patients. Survey instruments are devised by experts 
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who understand massive datasets and cast their  
nets much more broadly than, say, physicians do.  
The net effect is to ask better questions and to ask 
them in a better way, so that results can be efficiently 
compared and correlated. Nor is the population being 
surveyed limited to the ill and others who are or were 
“patients;” outside the medical system, survey  
populations can include millions who, in any given 
year, have no business with a doctor at all—and 
whose wellness may be able to teach just as much  
as others’ sickness.
 Just as important, “information volunteers,” as 
one might call those willing to be surveyed about 
medical questions, can be tapped for new information 
or follow-up questions as often as desired, not just 
when (and if) they seek treatment. Online interviews 
can easily be conducted for, say, fifteen minutes every 
three months indefinitely, with questions automatically 
tailored to participants. If the right question was not 
asked in the past, it can be added next time. And, of 
course, HIPAA and other medical-privacy rules do not 
apply to information freely given by people outside 
the context of medical treatment—a compelling  
advantage of the non-medical approach.
 One natural objection is that, in a voluntary 
sample, data donors will self-select in ways that  
skew the results. After all, not everyone will offer 
information or respond to requests for it, whether out 
of apathy, busyness, or privacy concerns. Responding 
populations may therefore be unrepresentative of the 
national population, the patient population, or both.
 Self-selection, however, is not as big a problem  
as it might appear on first blush. It turns out that 
many Americans are quite happy, indeed positively 
eager, to share health information in the cause of  
improving research, which could improve their health 
or that of families and friends. When asked, people 
often respond enthusiastically; a frequent complaint, 
indeed, is that there is not enough research to  
participate in. Privacy concerns are real, but  
experience suggests that many, if not most, people 
will be content with reasonable safeguards. Today’s 
public is well accustomed to Facebook and, by and 
large, understands that 100 percent privacy protection 
is neither possible nor desirable. In the age of Google, 
many view the health care system’s information  
lockdown less as a protection than as an artificial 
barrier to progress. So it is reasonable to hope for 
quite high response rates from broadly representative 
populations.27
 In addition, statisticians can, to a large extent,  
use sampling and other methods to control for 
self-selected populations. And, even a self-selected 
population contributing to a national health database 
would be a vast improvement over what exists today. 
If only, say, 5 percent of the population—or even just 
1 percent or 2 percent of the population, a figure in 
the low millions—were to connect themselves to an 
information network, the resulting dataset would be 
more than large enough to support an impressive 
amount of important research. The explosion of data 
entrepreneurs outside the health care sector means 
that we have an enormous well of talent, experience, 
and tools to draw on in normalizing the processing 
and integration of vast and diverse datasets. If we can 
make data available and connectable, the sheer size 
of the health care market will draw the data analytics 
talent toward it. 
 Which brings us to a final advantage of this  
“outside of medicine” approach to collecting health 
data, and a reason why we stress it as an example of 
smart innovation in health care: it is practicable. No 
 27  A cautionary note, however: confidence would erode in the event of one or more major episodes in which identifiable health data were 
leaked or stolen. Underlying this discussion of data gathering is the assumed premise that every reasonable precaution will be taken to  
de-identify and protect data, so that, insofar as possible, individual identities are not known to the system.
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radical break with existing policy, nor any extensive 
demolition of existing infrastructure, is needed. All 
the tools and technologies are at hand. Converting 
locked-in health information from a record-keeping 
burden to a resource is, indeed, the adjacent possible.
Barriers to Sharing: Opening the Silos
 Meaningful information comes in nuggets;  
data comes in sets. Individuals learn slowly; networks 
can learn very fast. To turn information into data  
and to link minds into networks, it is essential that  
information be shared, not hoarded. Yet, at many 
stages and in many ways, today’s health care  
incentives encourage hoarding. At the level of patient 
care, there are those aforementioned airtight privacy 
rules. In commercial health care R&D, the process  
of conducting drug trials and seeking patents  
discourages public exposure of information that  
may reveal failures or assist competitors. In academia, 
tenure and promotion flow from publication and  
citation of finished work; there is no reward for going 
to the time and trouble to share the data that underlie 
the finished work that may, especially when linked 
with other datasets, reveal many valuable secrets.
 To some extent the problem is cultural and  
cannot be changed overnight. Yet, here, too, we  
find promising incentive adjustments in the realm  
of the adjacent possible.
 Like it or not, the federal government is  
knee-deep in the business of medical research, 
through its own research, through its grants to  
private researchers, through the Food and Drug  
Administration’s oversight of drug approval, and  
its support of higher education. Libertarians may  
wish the government’s role were smaller, and  
liberals may wish for more federal activism, but the 
size of government per se is not the issue here. Rather, 
we point out that, in whatever role it assumes, the 
government necessarily creates incentive structures. 
On balance, those structures can and should be tilted 
to break down research silos and encourage data  
sharing rather than repressing it.
Silo-Busting at NIH
 A place to begin is the National Institutes of 
Health, an amalgam of twenty-seven research  
centers which, together, spend more than $30  
billion a year—half the entire world’s medical research 
budget. Proposing reform of the NIH is something of 
a cottage industry in the health policy world, and that 
is not a subject we propose to cover here. In several 
specific ways, however, the NIH can be a potential 
catalyst for an information-sharing culture.
 The so-called R01 grant, NIH’s mainstay form of 
support for researchers, emerged decades ago, at a 
time when research tended to focus on specific  
diseases and fairly narrowly defined problems. If, as 
much evidence suggests is the case, the marginal 
productivity of medical research has declined over 
the past few decades, that is partly because so much 
of the low-hanging scientific fruit has been picked. 
Meanwhile, the exponential rise of genome science 
and the growing prevalence of chronic, multifactor 
maladies have only made medical biology more  
complicated, as more genetic targets and more  
physiological systems clamor for attention.
 A system, then, that relies heavily on grants  
to only one or several investigators within a single 
institution is bound to be less productive today than  
in the 1950s and 1960s, when the archetypal  
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example of breakthrough medical research was the 
lone researcher hunched over a microscope. Today, 
making progress relies more than in the past on  
cross-disciplinary teamwork: efforts that span multiple 
investigators, and institutions, and disciplines. The unit 
of research looks more like a network, so to speak, 
and less like a pod. Yet, as one of our task force  
noted, nearly 90 percent of the researchers who hold 
R01 grants (and the R01-equivalent R23, R29, and 
R37 activity codes) hold only one such grant, which,  
in 2010, averaged roughly $400,000.28
 Although much good work is done on the  
traditional “let a thousand flowers bloom” model, 
small, siloed grants are less and less adequate to  
the task of assembling the broad skill sets needed  
to tackle the problems before us. Many private  
philanthropic funders of research understand this 
team concept, and approve and fund grants  
accordingly. NIH could and, we believe, should more 
energetically steer its grant-making authority to 
encourage cross-cutting research, with larger average 
grants made available to larger teams, many of them 
with participants from multiple institutions, and by 
requiring data sharing across institutions. This change 
would incentivize knowledge sharing at arguably the 
very most critical stage, when questions are being 
asked and research is taking shape.
 The same imperative to break down silos and 
combine minds from many disciplines also applies 
to the publication of data and code after research 
is published. Academic investigators have strong 
incentives to publish good finished work, which is a 
strength of the current U.S. medical research system. 
At the same time, however, these researchers have 
very little incentive to make available, in a digestible 
form, the data that underlie the published research. If 
anything, incentives flow more in the other direction: 
to process and share data requires time and resources, 
and it invites second-guessing. Data sharing allows for 
more than merely checking prior research, important 
although that is; it also allows subsequent research 
to compile and use the original data in ways that the 
original investigator could not have anticipated, and 
to combine it into larger datasets that create still more 
opportunities for discovery.
 Here, again, part of the problem is a long- 
embedded culture that prizes publication and  
citation in the tenure and promotion process and 
which places a particular premium on crediting 
researchers for doing original work. The scramble for 
priority fosters scientific competition between discrete 
individuals and institutions, but impedes joining  
forces across individual and institutional lines in large,  
interdisciplinary efforts that rely on accumulating  
and sifting data and attacking complex problems  
from many directions.
 Here, too, private organizations have shown 
that incremental incentives make a difference. Many 
private grantors require data sharing as a condition of 
grant-making. This is an incentive structure that we 
believe federal research funding—a major motivator in 
the research market—should emulate. Indeed, making 
the sharing of data, coupled with a requirement to 
deposit the complete raw dataset plus the source code 
for the analytical algorithms used to interpret, should 
be the default expectation for federal funding. These 
requirements would do more than any other single 
measure, or possibly more than every other measure 
28  R01-Equivalent grants: Average size. http://report.nih.gov/NIHDatabook/Charts/Default.aspx?chartId=158&catId=2.
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combined, to change the culture that treats data as 
proprietary. When NIH began requiring that finished 
research it funds be deposited in a public database, 
compliance rose from 4 percent to 85 percent.29 As 
shown in the chart below, this has had a dramatic 
effect on the number of publicly available research 
articles in the PubMed database.30
 Requiring that publicly funded data be shared 
in the same way is likely to be similarly effective. NIH 
already requires researchers receiving grants of more 
than $500,000 to submit plans to share their data.31 
Alas, compliance with the plan is not effectively  
monitored. The time to do that, we believe, is when 
grants come up for renewal. 
 Likewise, it is important to ensure that access to 
the literature is seamless and not firewalled, so that 
machines, and not just humans, can access text.  
So long as publications are walled in proprietary 
databases and require human interfaces to enter 
(e.g., passwords and logins), the immense power of 
semantic web, or even simple text-searching, cannot 
be achieved. Yet, it has long been apparent that the 
medical literature has become so vast and complex 
that no human mind or set of eyes can master even a 
clinically relevant subsector of it. We need help from 
computers, but we have made it impossible for  
computers to get ready access.
 A further important step is encouraging that  
data be shared in an intelligent, digestible way.  
Merely uploading data to a  
central location may be better 
than nothing—technology  
can do some of the work  
of organizing data and  
bridging variegated formats—
but far more valuable is to 
reward not just quantity, but 
quality, by encouraging the  
sharing of manicured, “sushi-
grade” data that emphasizes  
interoperability and ease of 
use. Standardization of data is 
a huge concern for the possibility of medical research 
we talk about here, and for the use of electronic 
medical records, which we discuss in the next chapter. 
 Curating data and putting it in usable formats, 
though not hugely expensive, costs money, and not  
all researchers are adept at doing it. It would be  
helpful, we believe, if grants included some funding 
for data scrubbing, whether performed by the original 
researchers or by outside experts. The task force  
discussed the need for developing intelligent  
computer programming scripts that could  
automatically recompile data into a standardized,  
accepted format. There was not a consensus about 
whether the federal government should take on this 
role of developing the scripts and maintaining  
29 Conversation with Neil M. Thakur, program manager for the NIH public access policy.
30 National Institutes of Health 2010 Office of Extramural Research Report, http://grants.nih.gov/grants/2010_oer_report.pdf.
31  National Institutes of Health. “Final NIH Statement on Sharing Research Data.” February 23, 2003. http://grants.nih.gov/grants/guide/notice-
files/not-od-03-032.html.
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standards, or whether a non-profit organization 
should take the lead.
 A challenge here is measuring the quality of 
data in order to reward it. Fortunately, counting how 
often data is downloaded, and thus how much use it 
receives, is relatively straightforward and increasingly 
easy. This is a measure to which, we believe, federal 
grant-makers would do well to pay more attention. 
Other metrics, which more precisely measure whether 
data is reused in subsequent work (rather than merely 
downloaded), are emerging; federal grantors should 
encourage and adopt such indictors as their availability 
and reliability grows.
Private Pathways to Data Sharing
 In suggesting that the government use its  
leverage to promote data sharing (and to help ensure 
that shared data is of good quality), we do not mean 
to suggest that there is no role for private efforts. 
Some are already under way—still embryonic, to be 
sure, but pointing the way toward a completely new 
system of open-source medical discovery.
 By way of example, consider Sage Bionetworks,  
a nonprofit medical research organization whose  
mission is not to conduct or finance new research, but 
to create and link data depositories that promise to 
let researchers work together in teams of hundreds or 
thousands, not twos or even tens. Sage Bionetwork 
projects include: 
n   A repository of genomic and disease-model  
datasets, allowing researchers to efficiently query 
a wide range of curated, collated data using an 
interactive online tool.
n   An online software platform creating a common 
workspace for online research collaboration,  
potentially allowing whole research communities 
to self-organize online.
n   A common data stream into which  
pharmaceutical companies could pour  
research data they feel they can safely share.  
Early indications are that pharmaceutical firms 
are eager to join such a data pool, because it 
helps them eliminate duplicative research, a major 
contributor to high drug development costs. (The 
average pharmaceutical research target has five 
companies working on it, each ignorant of the 
others’ failures.) Better still, the data stream could 
be opened to the outside world, “crowdsourcing” 
discoveries that drug companies focused on  
commercial products likely would miss.
n   The provision of “priority review vouchers” for 
companies that share all their failed trials data over 
a multi-year period. Such PRVs have a predictable 
cash value, can be traded and sold, and could 
serve as easy rewards for sharing data.
n   A project to help identify “non-responders,”  
patients on whom expensive drugs would be 
wasted or counterproductive. Three-fourths of  
cancer patients are non-responders for any given 
drug regime; much money and suffering could  
be saved by finding clues that help rule out  
ineffective treatments.
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 These projects and others like them, we think, 
provide just a hint of the benefits that efficient,  
large-scale data sharing may bring. Reducing the  
regulatory and cultural obstacles to data sharing and 
using government’s leverage to promote it should be 
leading priorities for health policy.
Lost in Translation: Making Knowledge 
Count
 The final stage of the data chain that turns  
information into outcomes is to embody knowledge in 
concrete treatments and protocols and make sure that 
it reaches health care’s “street,” the practitioners and 
patients on the front lines.
 An important place to begin is in the area of 
so-called translation, the process by which science 
becomes clinical medicine. The U.S. medical  
research system is strong on basic health research: 
understanding the causes of disease at the molecular 
level, for example, and finding potential targets for 
treatment. It is weaker, and less systematic, at  
translating basic knowledge into clinical applications. 
Translating basic research into high-value treatments 
does not happen automatically. Rather, it requires 
embodying laboratory discoveries as usable drugs, 
devices, and procedures; finding out if those new 
methods really work in people (they usually don’t,  
because human biology and culture are complicated 
and ornery); and then disseminating and applying  
that knowledge. Knowing a lot about how a molecule 
affects a protein is of little help in bridging those  
synapses; the translational stage often requires its  
own kind of research. 
 This is an area, fortunately, in which we are  
not a voice in the wilderness. Francis Collins, the  
NIH director, announced in 2011 the establishment 
within NIH of a new National Center for Advancing 
Translational Sciences, whose mission is to “catalyze 
the development and testing of novel diagnostics  
and therapeutics across a wide range of human 
diseases and conditions.”32 Collins argues for a 
“reengineering” of translational science akin to the 
focused, coordinated approach brought to human 
genomics a generation ago: “Little focused effort has 
been devoted to the translational process itself as a 
scientific problem amenable to innovation. As was 
the case with genomics, translational science needs to 
shift from a series of one-off solutions toward a more 
comprehensive strategy.”33
 We welcome this new translational emphasis. 
The impact of a new center remains to be seen, but 
Collins’s larger point is correct: translational research 
needs to be viewed as a discipline in its own right, 
supported by funding models that encourage  
interdisciplinary, applied research, and nourished by 
a stream of researchers trained for translation rather 
than merely seconded from other disciplines. “The 
triple frustrations of long timelines, steep costs, and 
high failure rates bedevil the translational pathway,”  
Collins correctly writes. “The average length of time 
from target discovery to approval of a new drug  
currently averages [approximately] 13 years, the  
failure rate exceeds 95 percent, and the cost per  
successful drug exceeds $1 billion, after adjusting  
for all of the failures.”34 To date, the record suggests 
an unfavorable international division of labor: the  
32 Francis S. Collins, “National Center for Advancing Translational Sciences: How Will It Work?” Presentation to Clinical Research Foundation 
Annual Meeting, April 27, 2011. https://www.dtmi.duke.edu/website-administration/files/Collins%20NCATS%20slides.pdf. Accessed August 
13, 2011.
33  “Reengineering Translational Science: The Time Is Right.” Science Translational Medicine, July 6, 2011. http://stm.sciencemag.org/
content/3/90/90cm17.full. Accessed August 13, 2011.
34 Ibid.
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United States conducts the best basic medical  
research, but other countries do better in applying  
it—increasing their health competitiveness relative  
to our own. And while the United States may  
generate the most high-tech medical innovations, 
other countries are better in applying low-tech  
medicine. The effort to encourage translational efforts, 
if anything, should be strengthened and accelerated. 
 More basic data “blocking and tackling” also is in 
order. For difficult diseases, especially those that are 
debilitating and life threatening, physicians should, 
as a matter of course, use established protocols and 
record medical information on standardized forms. 
Electronic health care records, the benefits from which 
we elsewhere stress not be overstated, nonetheless 
can be useful in this regard. Once digitized and  
standardized, patient data, disease status, and  
treatment outcomes are much better positioned to  
be analyzed. 
But Will It Cut Costs?
 In most industries, new technologies and  
discoveries tend to drive costs down, as competition 
selects for innovations that increase productivity.  
So far, unfortunately, health care has not worked  
this way. For some of the reasons sketched in the  
previous chapter—third-party payment, for example, 
and the perceived necessity of the very “best”  
treatment, regardless of cost—technological  
innovation has been a major cause of health care 
inflation. Often, generally adequate technologies  
and drugs are replaced by successors that cost much 
more but produce results that are little better.  
Arguably, the single most fundamental problem in  
the health care sector is the sad fact that innovation 
and productivity have been at loggerheads, creating  
a vicious cycle instead of a virtuous one. 
 Unlocking the power of modern techniques for 
gathering, sharing, and analyzing data can encounter 
the same problem. One can certainly imagine that  
sifting through mountains of data on, say, breast 
cancer or Parkinson’s disease might lead to expensive 
new therapies with only marginal health benefits. 
We believe that unleashing information will almost 
invariably improve treatment. But will it also improve 
productivity, the cost-effectiveness of treatment? That 
is a very different question.
 On the whole, we think the answer is yes.  
“Informationizing” the health care system not only 
brings to light new possibilities for research and  
treatment, but also sheds light on the comparative 
value of research and treatments. In other words, it 
generates not just knowledge that allows providers 
and patients to pursue better health; it also surfaces 
knowledge that allows them to set better priorities, 
focusing resources where they are more likely to  
pay off.
 That is why bringing the information  
revolution to health care offers multiple benefits.  
First, it will generate many innovations that improve 
health outcomes. Second, it will generate some  
innovations (new preventive measures and screening 
regimens, for example) that reduce costs in absolute 
terms, saving some money compared with the  
status quo.
 Of course, to gain the benefit of the  
priority-setting knowledge that data networking  
will uncover, Americans must set priorities. Alas, the 
system is rife with political and institutional obstacles 
to doing that, which brings us to the subject of the 
next chapter: changing incentives to reduce waste.
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 “Harvesting” waste? Don’t we mean “eliminating” 
waste? Or at least “reducing” waste?
 Yes, certainly. But a better way to begin than by 
thinking of waste as a failure or a nuisance is as an  
opportunity. Waste is a resource.
 In the 1970s, many futurologists predicted that  
the world would soon run short of vital natural  
resources. Among the reasons they were wrong is  
that they failed to appreciate the potential of waste. 
In the United States, where the most accessible oil and 
mineral deposits had long ago been exploited, copper 
companies, for example, developed technology that 
allowed them to go back to the mountains of tailings 
and other waste they had left behind and re-mine them 
for new copper. The oil industry developed directional 
drilling, in-hole sensors, and other techniques that let 
them recover new oil in old wells. Though some waste 
is indeed a result of pernicious or pointless behavior (as 
in “waste, fraud, and abuse”), much “waste” is better 
thought of as a resource that we have yet to discover 
how to exploit.
 The bad news—and the good news—about the 
health care system is that it is shot through with this 
kind of waste. Once a company or entrepreneur  
identifies waste and develops a way to eliminate or 
reduce it, that company has, in effect, created a  
new resource. Between 1997 and 2006, United  
Technologies, an industrial manufacturer, set  
ambitious goals to reduce energy use by taking  
measures that ranged from recycling waste steam  
to replacing light bulbs. It reduced its energy  
consumption by 20 percent over ten years even as  
its revenues more than doubled. The resulting  
savings—$50 million a year in lower energy bills, and 
$300 million a year less than if energy consumption 
had grown in line with revenues—dropped straight  
to the bottom line.35 
Chapter three
Harvesting Waste
35 Jonathan Rauch, “Turning Lights Down, and Profits Up.”  
National Journal, April 20, 2007.
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 In health care, the problem is that savings from 
reducing waste generally go straight to someone  
else’s bottom line. Because of third-party payment  
and government subvention, everyone in the system 
(except, ultimately, the taxpayer) is in a position to 
pass on costs, which means no one has a strong  
incentive to reduce them. Doctors are not rewarded 
for ordering fewer MRIs, hospitals for forgoing  
unnecessary new beds, patients for declining  
discretionary procedures, or insurance companies 
for reducing paperwork. Not even the taxpayer is 
necessarily rewarded for reducing health care costs, 
since any savings may go back out the door as other 
government spending. Where waste is concerned, the 
low-hanging fruit still dangles unpicked on the trees.
 Depressing though that may sound, the upside is, 
of course, that there is an abundance of low-hanging 
fruit to be picked. This is not to say it is easy pickings. 
Repairing broken incentives requires diverting  
resources from current beneficiaries and asking  
providers and patients to make hard choices. If  
that were easy, it would have been done already.  
Nor do we harbor any illusions that efficiency can  
turn around rising health costs any time soon; on 
the cost front, the country is rowing against a strong 
demographic current. But there are many billions  
of dollars to be harvested even from modestly  
incremental changes, and potentially trillions,  
over time, from ambitious ones.
 “Our health care system isn’t broken,” we  
were told by one health care analyst: “it’s getting 
exactly what it incentivizes.” In this chapter, we clarify 
what we mean by waste, briefly assess some current 
efforts to reduce it, and go on to draw attention, in 
more detail, to ideas we believe deserve more  
attention and development—all with an eye  
toward improving incentives.
 In economic jargon, waste can refer to  
deadweight loss or opportunity cost. Deadweight  
loss occurs when people engage in activity that  
has no economic value or actually destroys value.  
Opportunity cost occurs when people engage in  
activity that has some value, but less value than a 
more efficient use of resources would produce.
 Health care offers many examples of both  
kinds. Deadweight loss often occurs, for instance, as  
a result of duplicative and pointless transactional 
friction in billing practices. Some antiquated business 
practices are not just suboptimal but lead to mistakes 
and essentially throw providers’ and patients’ time  
and energy out the window; illegibly scrawled and 
inconveniently stored medical records come to mind. 
The “dirty little secret” about the redundant medical 
history forms that patients laboriously fill out every 
time they visit the doctor, we were told, is that no  
one reads them. Another widely cited source of  
deadweight loss is litigation, which often yields  
judgments only randomly related to either fairness or 
deterrence of medical misbehavior.
 Though deadweight loss is a serious problem  
and obviously should be vigorously addressed, we  
believe that still larger losses fall into the category 
of opportunity cost, in the form of low-value care (a 
more precise and compassionate term, we believe, 
than “unnecessary” care). This is where the big  
money lies, and it is here where the country will  
need to drill in order to “bend the cost curve.” But 
because low-value care is not always no-value care, 
reducing it requires making choices that people will 
resist. Low-value care brings us back to that familiar 
health care dilemma: the knottiest problems stem not 
from the system’s fault but its virtues, among which 
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is its reluctance to stint on any care that might  
conceivably do any good.
 We define low-value care as that which has a 
relatively low probability of improving the quality or 
quantity of life. Measuring quality and quantity of life 
is difficult, but the concept of the “quality-adjusted 
life year,” sometimes known as the QALY (“qualy”), 
provides a productive way for analysts, if not the  
general public, to think about it.36 Unfortunately, in 
the rush to provide reassurance that health reform 
would not bring about “death panels” or other forms 
of cold-blooded rationing, the 2010 Affordable Care 
Act (the health reform law) barred the government 
from developing guidelines or policies based on  
QALYs. Though we are not holding our breath, we 
would hope for that ban to be overturned, because 
the country cannot easily solve a problem that it  
cannot openly think about.
Three Current Approaches:  
An Assessment
 Recent legislation and other policy initiatives  
feature three prominent efforts to improve value in 
health care delivery. We offer some descriptive and 
evaluative comments here.
A. Comparative Effectiveness Research
 The medical system generally knows if a  
medication is safe and effective in controlled trials.  
But it knows much less about comparative  
effectiveness of drugs due to a dearth of head-to-
head trials, even less about the effectiveness of drugs 
in day-to-day use, as actually taken by patients. If a 
drug is being prescribed but patients won’t take it, 
because of inconvenience, or side effects, or for some 
other reason, it is not effective. The same is true  
of medical devices, surgical procedures, and  
“off-label” drug uses, all of which receive less  
(or no) pre-approval screening in the first place.  
As reported by The Washington Post, the medical 
research ecosystem has mostly failed to evaluate drugs 
and devices after they reach the market:
  Only 1.5 percent of money spent on medical 
research goes to “outcomes research,” of which 
comparative effectiveness is a sub-category.  
About 13,000 new clinical studies start up  
each year; about 112,000 are running now.  
A meticulous search in 2008 revealed only  
689 studies that fit the general description of 
“comparative effectiveness.” Many experts  
believe that’s not enough.37
 In an attempt to plug the gap, the 2009  
economic stimulus package included more than  
$1 billion for comparative effectiveness research, and 
the Affordable Care Act established an independent 
entity, the Patient-Centered Outcomes Research  
Institute, to help set priorities for effectiveness  
comparisons and to provide a permanent stream  
of funding.
 We believe comparative effective research can be 
a sound investment, and that the federal government 
has an important role to play. Information about  
effectiveness of various therapies is a public good, 
and, for that reason, comparative effectiveness  
research is likely to be under-funded if left solely  
with the private sector. 
 At the same time, however, there are dangers 
associated with having the federal government being 
the sole actor in conducting comparative effective 
36 See, generally, Peter Schuck and Richard Zeckhauser, Targeting in Social Programs: Avoiding Bad Bets, Removing Bad Apples (Washington, 
D.C.: Brookings Institution Press, 2006).
37 “‘Comparative Effectiveness Research’ Tackles Medicine’s Unanswered Questions,” August 16, 2011. http://www.washingtonpost.com/na-
tional/health-science/comparative-effectiveness-research-tackles-medicines-unanswered-questions/2011/08/01/gIQA7RJSHJ_story.html.
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analysis. This is because the government, through its 
Medicare program in particular, can have out-sized 
impacts on private sector practices potentially before 
definitive results are in. New therapies and procedures 
take time to be perfected and evaluated, and, if  
judgments about their cost-effectiveness are made too 
soon, many potential breakthroughs may not be paid 
for. If payments are not forthcoming, then innovators 
won’t try innovating in the first place. 
 In contrast, at least in principle, with multiple 
parties evaluating the cost-effectiveness of medical 
procedures, the market can help determine what gets 
reimbursed and what does not. The problem is that, 
because of free riding, no private sector actors may 
want to get involved in the comparative effectiveness 
business. One possible solution could be to have the 
government provide partial funding of multiple health 
insurers and/or providers to conduct these studies. But 
even then, once the government picks one particular 
set of results for any particular condition for purposes 
of reimbursement, that decision alone can drive  
reimbursement decisions by private actors. 
 In the end, we see no perfect solution to the 
potential downsides to full or partial government 
funding of CER. The upsides of publicly financed CER 
are sufficiently great, in our view, that they are likely 
to more than offset the downsides. 
 In any event, research can only be as good as  
the data it is based upon, and traditional clincal  
research can only do a piece of the job. Just as  
important, if not more so, is the “big data” approach 
that tells us what is going on in the real world. That 
is why—reinforcing the message of the previous 
chapter—it is so important to mobilize and share data 
on a far wider scale than in the past, and why the 
role of “data entrepreneurs” in mining databases for 
unlooked-for knowledge is so important. Much of the 
best comparative effectiveness research can be done 
in the wild, not in experimental settings, by capturing 
data currently lost in the system. 
 Value-driven Engineering (VdE) can be an  
important complement to CER. Whereas CER  
compares (by definition) the effectiveness against 
standard or best care of a given product or  
service whose production costs already have been 
incurred, VdE seeks to optimize savings and care for 
patient and the health care system through better 
design, development, and manufacturing of new  
pharmaceuticals, and the delivery of health care. In 
effect, with VdE, the health care system is treated 
as an engineering challenge focused on solving the 
problems with greatest medical payoffs. With VdE 
principles incorporated in the regulatory approval  
and reimbursement processes, less money would be 
spent on me-too drug research, which would reduce 
the numbers of drugs pursued and the money spent 
on them.38  
B. Electronic Medical Records
 Only a minority of physicians and hospitals  
maintain comprehensive information-technology  
systems. As any patient who has been told to fax an 
insurance preauthorization or put X-rays in the mail 
can attest, the need to bring medical information 
technology into the current century is dire. Like  
everyone else, we support it in principle. But we also 
urge caution about what to expect from it.
 In our view, the principal virtues of electronic 
records lie in the realm of improving service, not 
reducing cost. When records travel electronically with 
patients, or are shared automatically with multiple 
doctors, communication and coordination will be 
38 For a more detailed explanation of VdE, see Austen BioInnovation Institute in Akron, Value-driven Engineering for Global Competitiveness:  
A Call for a National Platform to Advance Value-driven Engineering, June 2011. Task Force Member Frank Douglas is the chair of the steering 
committee that produced this report and developed the VdE concept.
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smoother. When software “knows” which  
medications a patient is using and automatically  
alerts doctors to potential conflicts, or when it  
flags inconsistent instructions, it can help prevent 
medical error. By integrating billing and other  
back-office processes with medical functions, IT can  
improve workflow. Not least, getting paperwork 
hassles out of patients’ faces can improve patients’ 
experiences.
 Some electronic medical records advocates predict 
large cost savings. In particular, by integrating medical 
records with comparative effectiveness findings and 
clinical recommendations, IT theoretically could  
automatically flag procedures that are out of line  
with best practices or utilization rates that are  
conspicuously high. 
 While we support the use of IT to nudge providers 
toward better value (who wouldn’t?), we also caution 
against expecting too much, too fast. Success stories 
at particular institutions are all well and good, but  
getting a multiplicity of proprietary and frequently 
incompatible IT systems to talk to each other is a  
challenge that will take years to resolve. In the short 
term, the adoption of IT will likely raise costs, because 
there is so much infrastructure to build and debugging 
to do. Not least important, the power of IT to save 
money will not actually be used that way unless  
saving money is incentivized. For those reasons, a 
long, sometimes bumpy, and probably expensive  
transition period lies between the present and the 
routine realization of the cost-saving integration that  
electronic medical records seem to promise. 
 We do not mean to throw cold water on bringing 
health records and administration into the digital  
age, an idea which, to reiterate, we support and 
which will eventually do much good. Continuing  
contentedly with scribbled charts in file folders while 
the rest of the world has moved on to Google Docs 
would be absurd. We merely caution that electronic 
medical records may be necessary but are far from  
sufficient, and overhyping them risks diverting  
attention and resources from other important tasks.
C. Accountable Care Organizations
 The recognition that incentives need to  
change has led to wide interest in accountable care 
organizations (ACOs), which the Affordable Care Act 
seeks to promote. In the traditional care model, what 
providers provide is not accountability for a patient’s 
overall health but individual procedures, each  
separately coded and paid for—which is a bit like  
buying a car one part at a time, without regard to 
how it drives. Volume, not value, is rewarded.
 ACOs are an effort to rewire these incentives  
for at least part of the health care system. With  
ACOs, the government pays networks of providers to 
manage the health of at least 5,000 Medicare patients 
for at least three years. If they do the job efficiently 
and spend less than Medicare allots, they keep the 
difference, provided they adhere to specified quality 
standards.
 The payment structure is designed to incentivize 
cost-consciousness; the encouragement to form  
large networks is designed to stimulate vertical  
integration, so that providers will coordinate across 
disciplines and work in teams; basing payment on 
serving patients rather than delivering procedures is 
designed to reward value rather than volume.  
Together, those features are intended to seed what 
some have called “mini-Mayos:” smaller versions of 
the Mayo Clinic, a renowned health provider that is 
considered a model of relatively efficient vertical  
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integration and is popular with physicians and patients 
alike. (The Clinic’s employed 3,700 physicians are 
salaried and the system sees a million patients a year 
in facilities in Arizona, Florida, and Minnesota.)39 
 Like everyone else, we look upon the  
experiment with ACOs with curiosity and hope.  
Reasonable expectations will help keep the  
experiments on track. Near-term cost savings are likely 
to be small. The government estimates that the health 
reform law’s ACO initiative could save Medicare up to 
$960 million in the first three years, or “far less than 
1 percent of Medicare spending during that period,” 
according to Kaiser Health News.40 And Mayo owes 
its success at providing team-based care and vertical 
integration not only to its structure but, perhaps even 
more important, to its culture, which may be difficult 
to replicate. Whether ACOs can foster cultural change 
among their members remains an open question.
 That said, no one really knows how much  
money ACOs ultimately might save if they were to 
catch on and if they are given incentives to continue 
wringing out waste beyond the initial pilot programs. 
Nor can we predict how much they might improve 
upon today’s fragmented, often incoherent patient 
experience—potentially a great deal, if they prove to 
be an effective new paradigm. For that reason, we 
hope that policymakers of both parties will continue 
the ACO experiment for a sufficiently long period  
to assess whether their promise is fulfilled. We  
suggest similar efforts be made to experiment with a 
related concept, the Accountable Care Community, 
which focuses on patients, directing them to the  
appropriate provider in their immediate community  
to handle acute, chronic, or wellness problems.41 
 As we have continued to stress, incremental 
change is the only kind that will be effective and 
sustainable in health care. That said, however, there is 
room to consider fundamentals that existing reforms 
may not do enough to address. Most fundamental of 
all is a question rarely asked: Who needs doctors?
 “Health care” is a rubric that today obscures as 
much as it reveals. That wasn’t always the case. Years 
ago, “health care” meant going to the hospital for 
emergency treatment and to a primary care physician 
(or a dentist) for almost everything else. In that world, 
it made sense to think of medicine as synonymous 
with doctors. That is no longer the case in today’s 
world, with its proliferating specialization, complex 
chronic conditions, and care delivery in settings  
ranging from teaching hospitals to boutique clinics 
and grocery stores.
 Although we can imagine various ways to slice 
the pie, we think it most useful to think of today’s 
health care as comprising four related, but distinct, 
categories of care:
n   Acute: care for urgent or unstable conditions,  
or major interventions like surgery—generally  
provided in hospital;
n   Chronic: ongoing care for stable or predictably 
changing conditions;
n   Wellness: preventive and other measures to 
keep people healthy—generally provided at home 
and in the community; and
39 http://www.mayoclinic.org/about/facts.html.
40  Jenny Gold, “FAQ on ACOs: Accountable Care Organizations, Explained.” March 31, 2011. http://www.kaiserhealthnews.org/Stories/2011/
January/13/ACO-accountable-care-organization-FAQ.aspx. Accessed August 21, 2011.
41 The ACC model is being tested through a planning grant from the Centers for Disease Control in the Akron, Ohio, area.
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n   Integrative: oversight to ensure that the other 
three categories gel to provide coherent care.
 In today’s system, physicians routinely are involved 
in all four kinds of care. That was logical in the days 
when most patients saw only one physician for all 
their needs. Today, however, it means that too much 
high-priced talent is devoted to tasks that could be 
done just as well (or better) and much less expensively 
by non-physicians.
 We believe physicians should be lead providers of 
acute and integrative care; that is, they should make 
critical decisions when patients enter the medical 
system with a new problem, they should supervise 
and execute interventions until the patient is stable or 
well, and they should bear ultimate responsibility for 
(though not necessarily day-to-day management of) 
ensuring that the overall treatment program is sound.
 However, they should play a much more limited 
role in delivering chronic and wellness care. Patients 
who are managing stable and ongoing conditions 
such as diabetes, chronic lung disease, or even chronic 
heart disease generally do not need to see a doctor 
unless there is some change in their conditions; nurse 
practitioners or technical aides can evaluate them and 
provide such services as blood and pulmonary function 
tests, health coaching, and routine monitoring. 
 The potential savings from concentrating  
physicians where they really make a difference are 
large. The health care system is built for accidents  
and emergencies, yet more than 75 percent of U.S. 
health care spending is on chronic disease and its 
complications.42  
  After many decades in which “go see the doctor” 
was the automatic injunction for anyone who  
needed any kind of medical services, making patients 
comfortable with the idea of seeing the nurse  
practitioner, or even a health coach or nutritionist 
instead, will require a cultural change. Fortunately, the 
change is already under way. MinuteClinics, where 
people can get routine lab tests, vaccinations, and 
treatment for minor wounds and infections, have 
sprung up in CVS Pharmacy and Walgreens stores 
around the country; care is provided by nurse  
practitioners and physician assistants, and clinics 
often are open on weekends.43 RediClinic, a smaller 
but similar outfit, operates in more than forty H-E-B 
grocery stores in Texas.44 Overall, according to the 
Convenient Care Association, more than 1,200 such 
clinics operate in thirty-five states.45
 Although still a drop in the bucket, the growing 
popularity of the nurse practitioner model suggests 
consumers are receptive to user-friendly care in  
con-venient locations. Moreover, many practitioners 
welcome being freed to do more of what they do 
best. As one physician told us, most cardiologists  
do not particularly want to be responsible for  
administering maintenance doses of statin  
medications or supervising weight loss, and  
they aren’t particularly good at it.
 Even for emergency care, cheaper but no less  
effective alternatives to high-cost medicine at  
hospitals are emerging. Urgent-care clinics are  
beginning to spring up around the nation to provide 
acute care for a wide variety of non-life threatening 
accidents (cuts, broken bones, and the like) and  
illnesses (e.g., strep throat).46 Health insurance plans 
42 http://www.cdc.gov/chronicdisease/resources/publications/AAG/chronic.htm.
43  http://www.minuteclinic.com/about/history.aspx and http://www.minuteclinic.com/about/pressrelease.aspx?num=132, accessed August 19, 
2011.
44 http://www.rediclinic.com/news/opening_20_clinics_12-2010.php and http://www.rediclinic.com/faq.php, accessed August 19, 2011.
45 http://www.ccaclinics.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=4&Itemid=11.
46 Laura Landro, “At the Mall: New Clinics Let Patients Skip the ER: The Wall Street Journal, November 22, 2011, p. D1. 
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can encourage the patronage of these facilities 
through lower copays, thereby freeing up already 
crowded hospital emergency rooms for the treatment 
of more serious conditions.
 More could and, we believe, should be done to 
free the system to redeploy doctors. One step is to  
reform state licensing restrictions to allow nurse  
practitioners and other non-physicians to do more. 
Another is to change Medicare reimbursement rules 
to pay for treatments by nurse practitioners. The ACO 
model may be another way to encourage providers 
to use allied health professionals such as nurses to 
greater effect (if an ACO can employ a nurse in a  
doctor’s place it will save money and reap the reward 
of shared savings in the program). Still another idea 
is to encourage individuals to establish directives for 
end-of-life decisions, which would reduce use of  
physicians and other medical resources.47
What Do They Do? Incentivizing Value
 According to the Congressional Budget Office, 
around $700 billion, or one-third of annual health 
care spending in America, is of the low-value variety 
(“some, if not much, of it entirely unnecessary”).48 
Dollar figures, however, mask an assortment of  
oft-difficult questions and judgments. When we  
talk about reducing the utilization of low-value care, 
we are really asking: What care should the system 
provide? And what should it not provide?
 To see how best to answer those questions,  
it may be helpful to distinguish two meanings of  
“low-value,” one absolute, the other relative.
 To say a treatment is of low value in absolute 
terms is to judge that the improvement it purports  
to offer just isn’t very helpful (perhaps a CT for 
abdominal pain after an emergency doctor has already 
diagnosed appendicitis on the basis of a clinical exam) 
or unlikely to be beneficial (various species of back 
surgery). But judging value in absolute terms presents 
fraught choices and implies, to the public, valuing 
some people’s lives or wellbeing more than others’. 
We believe such value judgments are both inevitable 
and, in real life, common, even if most people  
prefer to look the other way. But we recognize their  
inherently contentious and painful nature. We think 
the most politically palatable path toward making  
better absolute-value choices for many types of care,  
particularly elective surgeries and tests, is to place 
more such decisions in front of patients themselves,  
a point we will explore in the next chapter.
 To say a treatment is of low value in relative terms 
is to say that there is a better or cheaper way to do 
it. Judgments of relative value, though still not easy, 
are less fraught. Most people would rather do things 
in better or cheaper ways when given the choice, 
provided they have a financial stake in the decision. 
Additionally, determinations of relative value often  
can be made by physicians and other health  
professionals in ways that are not transparent to 
patients. (The doctor, not the patient, decides whether 
to order a CT scan or make do with an X-ray.)
 Two categories of (relatively) low-value care  
are particularly problematic, in our view. The first is 
elective or preference-sensitive procedures and tests.49 
This might include a joint replacement, much cosmetic 
surgery, and, indeed, some cardiac interventions. U.S. 
regions vary up to tenfold in their elective-treatment 
rates, a variability too large to be explained by 
 
47 See Schuck and Zeckhauser (2006).
48  Peter Orszag, Statement before the U.S. House of Representatives Committee on the Budget, “Increasing the Value of Federal Spending on 
Health Care,” July 16, 2008, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/95xx/doc9563/07-16-HealthReform.pdf.
49 See J.E. Wennberg, E.S. Fisher, and J.S. Skinner, “Geography and the Debate over Medicare Reform.” Health Affairs, Jul-Dec 2002; Suppl Web 
 Exclusives: W96-114. 
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illness rates or patient preferences.50 So what accounts 
for the variation? “Who you see is what you get,”  
as one analyst told us: the choice of elective care is 
highly sensitive to physicians’ recommendations,  
and physicians tend to follow the practices of their 
nearby peers. If everyone else is recommending spinal 
fusion for uncomplicated low back pain, and cardiac 
catheterization for low-risk patients, then I should, 
too. This is herd instinct, not science.
 Moreover, many patients get care that the best 
current guidelines suggest is inappropriate for them.51 
Twelve percent or so of angioplasties, stents, and 
angiograms are inconsistent with accepted guidelines, 
yet Medicare pays for them.  It also pays for the use 
of drugs against FDA guidelines, such as Avastin® for 
breast cancer.
 A second problematic category is supply-sensitive 
care. Especially common in routine care of the  
chronically ill, this is care whose utilization depends  
in some significant measure on the availability of  
providers and equipment—all of which generate 
income when put to use. Rates at which patients see 
physicians, are admitted into the hospital, or receive 
tests (such as CTs) vary between regions and hospitals 
by a factor of two to three.
 The decision to hospitalize—a quite expensive 
decision—deserves particular attention. What  
determines whether you get sent to the hospital?  
In non-acute cases, not science: scientific guidelines 
on when to hospitalize are next to nonexistent. The 
decision to hospitalize is entirely discretionary, and 
doctors are influenced by the supply of medical 
resources and the practice patterns they see around 
them—which, of course, are influenced by the  
resource supply. Other things being equal, more  
hospital beds translate into more hospitalization.52 
 In principle, comparative effectiveness research 
and propagation of best-practices guidelines can 
help reduce the incidence of low-value care over the 
medium and long term, but will not eliminate it. What 
might do even more in the short run, however, is to 
use Medicare’s payment leverage to encourage more 
focus on high value. For example, Medicare should 
not pay to use drugs in ways the FDA deems  
ineffective, or to support treatments regarded as  
inappropriate by standard guidelines. Medicare could 
help curb the uncontrolled expansion of health care 
system capacity  (more beds, more doctors, which 
leads to more spending) by penalizing hospitals and 
organizations whose high capacity and cost make 
them outliers. This would help break the cycle of  
oversupply that creates its own demand. Medicare 
might tell hospitals whose per-capita delivery of  
end-of-life care (some of which is of marginal utility 
to patients, at best, and probably no-value at worst) is 
in, say, the top 5 percent, that they cannot receive any 
more in total payments than they did in the prior year. 
Discouraging outliers would force them, and the bond 
markets, to reconsider the use of capacity construction 
as a cash cow.
What Are We Paying For?  
Buying Outcomes
 For many health care experts, the holy grail of 
payment reform is to pay for health outputs, not 
inputs: that is, to reimburse for value, not volume. 
Payments to providers should, it’s widely agreed, be 
based not on how many procedures they perform, but 
on how much patients’ health and wellbeing improve. 
The movement for accountable care organizations, 
50 S. Brownlee, et al. “Improving Patient Decision-Making in Health Care: A 2011 Dartmouth Atlas Report Highlighting Minnesota, Dartmouth  
 Atlas Project, February 24, 2011, www.dartmouthatlas.org/publications/reports.aspx.
51 P.S. Chan, et al. “Appropriateness of Percutaneous Coronary Intervention,” JAMA, 2011, July 6: 306(1): 53–61.
52 John E. Wennberg, Tracking Medicine: A Researcher’s Quest to Understand Health Care (New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). 
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discussed above, is a variation on that theme; ACOs 
are paid to treat patients, not administer procedures, 
and they pocket any gains they find by improving 
value—so that, in effect, they are being incentivized to 
improve the ratio of outputs to inputs.
 We also support other, more direct methods to 
change to an outcomes-based payment system, and 
here, too, incremental change—albeit, in this case, 
too incremental—is already under way. Policymakers 
have been nudging Medicare providers to measure 
value-added since at least 2003.53 The 2010 health 
care reform legislation added provisions that not  
only measure value but reward it: for example, a 
“value-based purchasing program,” which directs 
Medicare incentive payments to hospitals that meet 
certain performance standards.54 
 Expectations should be limited; moving a  
behemoth like Medicare is like steering the  
proverbial aircraft carrier, except with many  
competing hands on the steering wheel. But the  
principle of purchasing value is gaining traction,  
and Medicare is the right policy lever to use. And  
there is considerable “low-hanging fruit” to be  
harvested by substituting more cost-effective drugs 
and therapies for less-effective ones. 
Where Are the Barriers? Getting Law  
and Regulation Right
 Moving from fee-for-service to fee-for-value will 
take years, if not decades. In the nearer term, a good 
place to harvest waste is by removing or reforming  
legal and regulatory obstacles that, in effect,  
encourage nonproductive behavior. There are many  
to consider, far more than could fit within the  
compass of this paper, so we choose to focus on  
three possibilities.
A. Medical Malpractice Reform
 The medical malpractice system is hardly new  
to the health care reform agenda. Physicians and 
politicians have been up in arms about it for decades. 
Some states have made important reforms, largely by 
capping damages for “non-economic” losses (pain 
and suffering), but progress is fitful because the  
politics are contentious and opposition from the trial 
bar is strong. Furthermore, the threat of liability, if 
focused correctly on the truly negligent cases, can 
be an important device for reducing physician errors. 
Nonetheless, we believe malpractice reform is worth 
pursuing, because the current system is both  
ineffective and excessively expensive.
 Ineffective, because malpractice lawsuits  
frequently are driven by dissatisfaction with the  
doctor-patient relationship—that is, with patients’ 
anger at their doctors, justified or not—rather than 
by any objective nexus between a bad outcome and 
malfeasance.55 In medicine, after all, bad outcomes 
happen all the time, even when physicians do their 
jobs well. Patients, jurors, and judges generally lack 
the expertise to evaluate medical decision-making, 
the incentive to do so with detachment, or both. The 
result is that damages are awarded little better than 
randomly. Many awards flow to patients who were 
not, in fact, victims of malpractice, while most  
victims of malpractice never sue and thus are not  
compensated.
53  See, e.g., Jane Hyatt Thorpe and Chris Weiser, “Medicare Quality Measurement and Reporting Programs,” February 9, 2011. Published by 
Health Reform GPS, a project of George Washington University’s Hirsh Health Law and Policy Program and the Robert Wood Johnson  
Foundation. http://www.healthreformgps.org/resources/medicare-quality-measurement-and-reporting-programs/ Accessed Aug. 20, 2011.
54  Jane Hyatt Thorpe and Chris Weiser, “Medicare Value-Based Purchasing Programs,” March 30, 2011. Published by HealthReformGPS, a 
project of George Washington University’s Hirsh Health Law and Policy Program and the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. http://healthrefor-
mgps.org/resources/medicare-value-based-purchasing-programs/. Accessed Aug. 20, 2011.
55  Beth Huntington and Nettie Kuhn. “Communication gaffes: a root cause of malpractice claims.” Proc (Bayl Univ Med Cent). 2003 Apr;16(2): 
157–161; discussion 161. http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/16278732. 
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 Malpractice litigation is expensive, because  
soaring malpractice insurance premiums flow through 
to the public by way of higher provider charges,  
and because fear of lawsuits encourages physicians  
to overprovide care. Estimates of the cost and  
pervasiveness of so-called defensive medicine vary 
(and are not terribly reliable) but are non-trivial. One 
2010 study found that the medical liability cost was 
about $56 billion a year in 2008 dollars, or about 2.4 
percent of total health care spending, of which $46 
billion, or more than 80 percent, resulted from  
defensive medicine.56 
 A number of directions have been proposed for 
reform, and, in truth, we believe any of them, or 
some combination, would be preferable to the status 
quo. One approach would recognize medical error 
and bad outcomes as facts of life and would set up 
a compensation system outside of the courts, with 
expert evaluators providing payments based on fee 
schedules. Under such a “no-fault” approach, more 
people would be compensated, compensation would 
be more closely linked to science, and the process 
would be more predictable and less scary for doctors 
and patients alike.57 Not least important, the 
doctor-patient relationship may improve when 
physicians feel they can apologize to patients 
without teeing up a lawsuit. One disadvantage,  
however, would likely be higher, rather than lower, 
cost, precisely because more compensation would  
be delivered. Another is the political difficulty of  
creating what amounts to a whole new kind of  
adjudication system, which would need to be built 
and debugged from scratch—not, in our judgment, 
the most realistic of prospects.
 A second approach, although more modest, is 
demonstrably workable inasmuch as some states are 
trying it: change the liability rules. When Texas capped 
noneconomic damages, the dollars flowing through 
the state’s medical tort system substantially dried up, 
partly because fewer cases were brought and partly 
because damage awards were lower, according to 
task force member David Hyman. Although pain and 
suffering are real and deserve sympathy (and perhaps 
payment, if jury discretion can be limited), they are  
impossible to quantify in any consistent or objective 
way, while their deterrent function continues to be  
the subject of vigorous debate. Another liability  
reform is to eliminate punitive damages, which are 
inappropriate for medical malpractice and invite 
incensed jurors to levy damages out of proportion 
to reason. Their only legitimate function is to deter 
deliberate misbehavior or negligence—which is not a 
serious problem with physicians, and not a deterrent 
inasmuch as insurers, not doctors, pay the claims.
 A third and, so far, promising approach is to  
channel medical malpractice claims into special 
“health courts” where the decision-makers are  
former or retired physicians or other medical experts.58 
Given the complex and highly specialized nature of 
medicine, the notion of having real experts has much 
appeal. The 2010 health care reform legislation  
encourages pilot projects for health courts at the  
state level. We endorse this idea as well as efforts to 
evaluate the results. 
 One final reason to get on with malpractice 
reform is to remove it from the agenda. It has hung 
around for decades and has become something of a 
mantra, which, frankly, distracts policymakers and the 
public from the need for many other reforms. We are, 
again, under no illusion that malpractice reform (or 
56  Michelle M. Mello, Amitabh Chandra, Atul A. Gawande, and David M. Studdert, “National Costs of the Medical Liability System.” Health 
Affairs, September 2010. http://content.healthaffairs.org/content/29/9/1569.abstract. See also http://blogs.wsj.com/health/2010/09/07/how-
much-does-defensive-medicine-cost-one-study-says-46-billion/.
57 The no-fault approach has been adopted by New Zealand. See Peter H. Schuck (2009), “Tort Reform, Kiwi-Style,” Yale Law & Policy Review. 
58 This idea has been developed and actively promoted by Common Good, and its President and Founder, Phillip Howard.
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almost anything else in the world of health care)  
is politically easy, but the sooner it is attended to,  
the sooner the debate can move on.
B. Reform the “Medical Loss Ratio” Rule
 The Affordable Care Act sought to reduce  
the share of health insurance dollars flowing to  
administrative overhead, but it went about the task 
in a heavy-handed and arbitrary way. Depending on 
the size of its coverage base, every health insurer must 
spend at least 80 percent to 85 percent of premiums, 
net of certain taxes, on medical care and specified 
activities that improve quality (as opposed to  
administration). The current average “medical  
loss ratio” (medical payouts as a share of total  
premiums), including estimated premiums for  
employers’ self-funded plans, is around 87 percent; 
the rule thus takes aim at inefficient insurers, or so  
it hopes.
 The approach is perverse, however. The loss  
ratio rule encourages expenditures that increase 
health care costs while discouraging insurer activities 
and coverage designs, such as certain types of  
utilization review and higher-deductible plans, that 
could help reduce costs.
 We believe the medical loss ratio rule is an  
example of the kind of regulation that stifles  
innovation on the business side of health care,  
where innovation is almost as important as on the 
medical side. But some regulation of the health  
insurance industry—one of America’s least popular 
and least trusted—is inevitable. We think there is an 
opportunity here to reconceive incentives dynamically, 
so that insurers have more incentives to innovate in 
ways that lower costs.
 The physician we mentioned earlier who bills for 
four separate procedures every time he places an I.V. 
does so because the current system provides no  
incentives for insurers to reduce red tape. At times, 
the system does just the opposite. The health  
insurance industry’s name is a bit of a misnomer; 
unlike, say, property and casualty insurance, it has 
generally played a more modest role in managing 
risk. Instead, much of the industry acts more like a 
financial-services business, processing payments and 
collecting fees. As with credit-card companies and 
brokerages, the more transactions insurers process, 
the more they earn (other things being equal).
 Increased concern with cost growth by  
employers and other customers, however, is helping  
to encourage innovations that help manage risk.  
With additional dynamic incentives, the insurance  
industry, we believe, could become a powerful force 
for modernization and innovation on the business  
side of the health care business. It has more data  
on medical utilization than any other player (except 
Medicare) because most procedures and prescriptions 
get billed through insurance companies. If the  
industry were further encouraged to use its  
knowledge base to predict and manage utilization  
and costs, and if it worked with providers to do the 
same, it could become a proactive source of new 
productivity and much less of a passive conduit for 
funding cost growth.
C. Interim Drug and Device Approval
 Another regulatory flaw, and one that is politically 
easier to redress, puts a drag on innovation. Currently, 
once a drug or device attains FDA approval, it goes  
on the market without further scrutiny. Yet a drug is 
completely safe only if it doesn’t do anything, and 
even the most exhaustive clinical trials will not find all 
the problems that may arise in real-world, large-scale 
use. If a new drug causes bad reactions, the likely 
result will be panic and a potentially crippling  
legal assault on the company that made it. For  
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pharmaceutical firms, putting a new medication or 
device on the market can be a high-risk and costly 
endeavor.
 A better approach would be to allow interim  
approval. During this stage, new drugs and devices 
could be placed in the hands of physicians who  
have been trained to handle them and who could 
monitor the results. In exchange for putting new  
technologies “on watch,” their developers would 
receive protection from legal liability during the  
probationary period, and some assurance of coverage 
and reimbursement, with a share of sales proceeds  
set aside for a fund to pay for compensatory care for 
patients who have bad reactions. The result would 
be to allow manufacturers and physicians to say to 
patients, in effect, “try it, you’ll like it,” and to bring 
innovations into the market at lower risk and  
therefore, presumably, lower cost. That interim  
approval would need to be accompanied by a  
robust post-market surveillance effort that would 
more rapidly weed out ineffective or dangerous  
devices and drugs, thus speeding up the innovation 
cycle by making room for better products.
 Another attractive idea, outlined more than  
a decade ago, is to provide conditional coverage  
during the research phase for promising but expensive 
interventions, provided that researchers contribute 
data to studies that can evaluate risks, efficacy, and 
cost-effectiveness.59  
Rediscovering Diagnostics:  
An Opportunity Renewed
 We conclude with a point that shows how  
the themes of the previous chapter (harnessing  
information) and this one (harvesting waste) can  
powerfully reinforce one another. 
 The graying of the Baby Boom generation 
presents the country with a daunting health care 
cost problem. Consider just cancer. According to the 
National Cancer Institute, by 2020 the incidence of 
malignancies in the population will rise by 20 percent 
to 40 percent. If therapies are applied as at present, 
the annual cost of treating cancer will rise from $124 
billion today to more than $200 billion in 2020.60
 A commonly cited floodwall against the rising 
gray tide is to detect and treat diseases earlier, e.g., 
catching cancer before it metastasizes or invades. 
Now, there is nothing new about prescribing  
early diagnosis. In cancer treatment, it has been  
a mantra for years—and it has often led to  
over-diagnosis and over-treatment. Controversies  
have dogged PSA screening for prostate cancer  
and mammograms for breast cancer. 
 The story does not end there, however. The 
advent of data-intensive medicine, discussed in the 
previous chapter, along with quick and inexpensive 
genomic profiling, suggests the prospect of a more 
selective kind of diagnostic screening—or, rather, two 
kinds. The first uses biomarkers to identify individuals 
who are at elevated risk of developing particular  
diseases. Rather than trying to screen the whole  
population, over-diagnosing many and treating  
all detected tumors based on gross statistical  
probabilities, this form of diagnosis bases  
screening and treatment on individual genomes  
(individual genotyping), assessment of which genes 
are turned on and off (gene expression profiling),  
and granular probabilities based on studying genes 
and proteins in tumors and tissues. With the use of 
diagnostic biomarkers to detect pre-metastatic  
59 H. J. Aaron and H. Gelband, eds. Extending Medicare Reimbursement in Clinical Trials. National Academy Press: Washington, D.C. 2000.
60  See, e.g., Angela B. Mariotto, K. Robin Yabroff, Yongwu Shao, Eric J. Feuer, and Martin L. Brown, “Projections of the Cost of Cancer Care in 
the United States: 2010–2020,” Journal of the National Cancer Institute 2011:103, 117–128, http://www.oxfordjournals.org/our_journals/jnci/
press_releases/mariotto.pdf.
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carcinomas in high-risk individuals, cancers that  
otherwise would develop into complicated and  
frequently devastating cases often could be treated  
by removing a tumor no larger than a centimeter.  
According to Dr. George Poste, one of our task  
force members, the ability to detect and diagnose 
malignancies and to surgically remove them before 
metastasis occurs would eliminate more than 80 
percent of the rapidly escalating cost of cancer care. 
Unfortunately, however, only about 3 percent of  
public and private investment in cancer research  
focuses on diagnostic biomarker technology, as  
opposed to, say, searching for the latest drug. 
 A second form of test diagnoses not people’s 
susceptibility to diseases but their responsiveness  
to medications. Oncologists, as one expert told us,  
too often “assault people with drugs they know  
probably aren’t going to work.” Any particular drug 
might work, but the odds are against it, so physicians 
try one after another, a process that is both expensive 
and physically and mentally exhausting for patients. 
 New diagnostics based on genome sequencing 
and proteomics can help preemptively rule out  
treatments that are likely to fail in particular patients. 
To take just one example, KRAS testing—a test of  
patients with colorectal carcinomas—can detect a 
genetic mutation that renders patients unlikely to 
respond to two first-line immunotherapies that block 
a cell-surface receptor called EGFR. According to the 
American Society of Clinical Oncology, if every  
colorectal cancer patient were profiled with this test 
on first diagnosis, the health care system would save 
about $600 million a year; yet the adoption rate of 
the test is only about 10 percent. Extending the same 
technique through other altered molecular targets in 
the same molecular pathways could exclude almost 
80 percent of patients from getting ineffective drugs, 
producing even more impressive savings. At present, 
however, there is little economic incentive for  
researchers to develop such diagnostics or for  
clinicians to adopt them; in a fee-for-service system, 
no one makes money by providing less care.
 We believe the medical research system,  
public and private, should invest more in  
diagnostics relative to treatments. Medicare and  
other government programs can encourage this  
by making a point of making most diagnostics  
reimbursable, just as treatments are.
 There is a broader point here that relates to more 
than just diagnostics. Two important opportunities 
now present themselves. One is the advent of “big 
data,” the availability of vast amounts of health  
information which, combined with genomic profiling 
and comparative effectiveness research, increasingly 
allows diagnostics to find needles in haystacks, rather 
than examining entire haystacks. 
 For example, as science marches on, the cost of 
sequencing the whole genome eventually will come 
close to the costs of conducting genetic tests for  
just one or a few genes. Whole-genome sequencing 
will provide an enormous amount of baseline data 
that will become part of a person’s individual and 
family history, which, together with lab tests, surely 
will prove to be extremely valuable and life-extending 
for many individuals. Put simply, the odds that, during 
one’s life, genomic sequence data will prove to be 
more valuable than several thousand dollars, the  
current cost of obtaining it, have to be overwhelming. 
 Similarly, the emergence of value-driven payment 
models is highly likely to make looking for medical 
needles economically worthwhile. Combine this with 
genomics sequencing, and surely we can develop 
more effective diagnostics and use them more  
efficiently than in the past. Through the still-misty 
but unmistakably visible terrain ahead, we can surely 
begin to see a path toward higher-value health care 
that awaits us. 
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 If we come to the role of patients last, it is not  
because they matter least. Quite the contrary.  
Patients’ needs and decisions—how healthy or  
sick they are, whether to see a doctor, whether to 
accept medication, whether to risk an operation, and 
so on—remain the most important determinants that 
drive and steer health care decision-making. It also is, 
perhaps, the most broken feature.
 For all the time and money spent on them, 
patients, or health care consumers (in some respects 
a better term, because it includes able-bodied users 
of preventive and other health services), often feel 
marginalized—and, in important ways, they are.  
Physicians tell them what to do; insurance companies 
tell them what will be covered; employers tell them 
who will be their insurer; and politicians make  
policy in negotiations where consumers are the  
least-organized voice at the table. Running the  
gauntlet of specialists, and tests, and hospitals, and 
offices, patients feel like mice in a maze of someone 
else’s (or, worse, no one’s) devising, with little real 
responsibility for or control over the system of which 
they are part. There are few, if any, other sectors of 
the private economy in which the end user has so little 
influence over the product and its delivery.
 That said, most people, though unhappy with 
“the system,” are happy with their own doctors  
and the care they personally receive. Most are  
understandably conservative about change, which  
is one reason the political system has been slow to 
embrace some of the reforms we and others  
advocate. Any reform that is presented as taking 
something away from consumers will be greeted with 
skepticism, if not outright hostility. This does not mean 
never downsizing or retrenching; in today’s fierce  
fiscal headwind, the country will have no choice but  
Chapter fOur
Empowering patients
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to both shrink and trim. It does mean, wherever  
possible, conceiving of and couching reforms in a 
framework of giving to patients: giving more  
information, more control, better success rates, and  
a better experience. Offering them today’s experience 
at a higher cost to themselves is a political loser, even 
if it were a fair proposition.
 In this chapter, we consider some ways in which 
patients can add value to the system rather than just 
consuming it, by being given tools and incentives to 
make better decisions, share in productivity gains, and 
take full ownership of their own information stream.
Give Patients the Tools for Better Decisions
 We begin with the most fundamental decision of 
all: the decision to undergo treatment. We believe this 
is one of the most promising and least appreciated 
leverage points for making the system simultaneously 
more humane and more productive.
 From time immemorial, “Doctor’s orders” has 
meant, “Gotta do it—no choice.” Although, in the 
Internet age, patients often show up for medical  
appointments seeking purported cures they saw  
online, most people still look upon physicians as 
authoritative experts. And, trust in doctors is a good 
thing. As one physician told us, “The patient has to 
think you’re God to let you cut them up.”
 However, there is growing reason to doubt a 
related assumption, which is that patients want all  
the treatment doctors can throw at them, especially  
if someone else is paying—or that they are too  
confused to think about value. It is true, as opponents 
of shifting more health care costs to patients like to 
point out, that patients experiencing health crises  
often are too frightened, bewildered, or ill-informed 
to make hard medical decisions. Something can be 
done about this.
 About a third of health care is preference- 
sensitive. Such care is often called elective because 
there is more than one way to treat the condition 
and no treatment is often an option. In other words, 
patients have a legitimate choice about the kind of 
treatment they prefer to receive. Common examples 
include treatment for early-stage prostate and breast 
cancer; hip, knee, and spine osteoarthritis; chest pain 
and stroke risk associated with arterial heart disease; 
and so on.61 For early-stage prostate cancer, four or 
five treatment pathways often are available. Or take 
early-stage breast cancer. Women have a choice 
between mastectomy, which involves the removal of 
the entire breast, and lumpectomy, which involves 
surgical excision of the tumor itself, with radiation 
after surgery. Clinical evidence suggests that either 
treatment offers women the same chances of survival. 
What differs is the impact on an individual patient’s 
sense of herself and her wellbeing—and that varies 
from patient to patient.62 
 How do patients choose? Often they do as their 
doctor recommends, which is one reason treatment 
patterns vary so dramatically from region to region: as 
we have seen, “who you see is what you (often) get,” 
and doctors follow local practice patterns and market 
signals. For example, a recent study by the Dartmouth 
Atlas Project found that rates of mastectomy and a 
61  Benjamin Moulton and Jaime S. King. Aligning Ethics with Medical Decision-Making: The Quest for Informed Patient Choice. Journal of Law, 
Medicine & Ethics, Spring 2010. Moulton is a member of this task force.
62  Shannon Brownlee, Vanessa Hurley, and Ben Moulton, “Patient Decision Aids and Shared Decision Making,” Policy Brief (New America  
Foundation Health Policy Program, September, 2011). 
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number of common cardiac procedures, including 
angioplasty and stents, varied ten-fold across hospital 
referral regions.63 Such variation can be driven by a 
single physician practice, as was the case in the city  
of Elyria, Ohio, where one prominent group of  
cardiologists drove the angioplasty rate for Medicare 
patients to four times the national average.64  
 This high variation in rates of preference-sensitive 
treatments has obvious implications both for medical 
ethics and health care spending. In many cases,  
however, patients receive (or feel they receive) too 
little medical information to make an informed choice, 
and still less guidance to help them understand and 
act on their underlying values and preferences. As a 
result, write Benjamin Moulton and Jaime S. King, 
patients “adopt not only their physician’s treatment 
choices, but also their physician’s values, levels of risk 
aversion, and personal preferences.”65 
 That might be all right if doctors’  
recommendations were reliable proxies for  
patients’ preferences, or even if doctors could  
reliably assess preference; but this is not the case. 
Moreover, studies find that physicians tend to skew 
their discussions toward emphasizing the benefits of 
surgery and understating risks.66 As a result, clinical 
evaluation research studies suggest that patients are 
routinely asked to make decisions about treatment 
choices in the face of what can only be described as 
avoidable ignorance:
  In the absence of complete information,  
individuals frequently opt for procedures they 
would not otherwise choose. Mounting clinical 
evaluative evidence suggests that the number 
of surgical procedures performed, even when 
justified by practice guidelines, actually exceeds 
patients’ desires when they are fully informed 
through a shared decision-making process.67 
 “Shared decision-making” refers to a budding 
movement that converts what today is often the  
patient’s rote signature on an (ironically named)  
informed consent form into a guided dialogue  
between patient and provider. The idea is to lay out 
for the patient, and then help them work through, 
the pluses and minuses of treatment options—in a 
way that not only conveys medical information but 
that also helps the patient understand and make value 
choices about the relevant lifestyle implications and 
risk-reward tradeoffs.
 In one common model, a patient with early-stage 
prostate cancer is provided with a video and a printed 
guide giving a balanced discussion of the options, 
including their likely benefits and risks; completes a 
questionnaire helping providers to understand the 
patient’s priorities and values and bringing to light 
conflicting desires; and, with the resulting information 
in hand, meets with doctors and other health  
professionals who have been coached on the shared 
decision-making process. One might think of the  
process as informed consent raised to a higher  
power: consent based not just on a yes-or-no  
recommendation or on a one-size-fits-all summary of 
medical evidence, but on a “more robust discussion, 
63  Shannon Brownlee, et al., “Improving Patient Decision-Making in Health Care: A 2011 Dartmouth Atlas Report Highlighting Minnesota.” 
Dartmouth Atlas Project, February 24, 2011. http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/downloads/reports/Decision_making_report_022411.pdf.
64  Reed Abelson, “Heart Procedure Is Off the Charts in an Ohio City.” New York Times, August 18, 2006. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/08/18/
business/18stent.html.
65  Moulton and King, p. 3.
66  Brian J. Zikmund-Fisher et al., The DECISIONS Study: A Nationwide Survey of United States Adults Regarding Nine Common Medical  
Decisions.” Medical Decision Making, September-October 2010, 30(5 Suppl): 20S-34S. http://mdm.sagepub.com/content/30/5_suppl/20S.
abstract.
67  Moulton and King, p. 5, fn. 38.
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which engages both the patient and the physician in  
evaluating the patient’s medical goals and lifestyle 
preferences to come to an informed choice.”68 
 The results are impressive. In a review of  
eighty-six randomized controlled trials, patients given 
decision aids were better informed about treatment 
options. Studies found that using patient decision aids 
improved knowledge of health care choices, increased 
the proportion of patients with realistic perceptions 
of benefits and harms, lowered decisional conflict, 
reduced the number of patients who were passively 
involved in decision-making, reduced the number of 
patients undecided after counseling, and improved 
alignment of patient values and health care options 
chosen. Moreover, patients were 20 percent less likely, 
on average, to choose the more invasive option—
with medical outcomes that were just as good.69 An 
estimate by the Lewin Group in 2009 found that fully 
implementing shared decision-making in the Medicare 
population for eleven conditions that could be treated 
with surgery could save Medicare $50 billion over ten 
years (a benefit in addition to closer alignment with 
informed patient preferences).70 
 We embrace shared decision-making because 
it can help reduce utilization of low-value care and 
because it is a better way of doing business—reasons 
enough, to be sure. Furthermore, some places already 
are proving it in practice. Clinical models delivering 
shared decision-making have been funded in several 
states.71 The state of Washington, for example,  
created incentives for shared decision-making by  
giving doctors who use it added protection from  
lawsuits based on allegations that the physician failed 
to properly inform patients of risks. The 2010  
Affordable Care Act includes shared decision-making 
among the innovations to be developed and  
promoted by the Department of Health and Human 
Services, though Congress failed to appropriate funds. 
Gradually, support for the concept is building, and a 
nascent infrastructure is taking shape.
 Not least important—here returning to the 
concept of absolute value that we broached in the 
previous chapter—we also see shared decision-making 
as a powerful, albeit partial, solution to health care’s 
thorniest political problem. Who decides which care  
is of low value in absolute terms? That is, which  
care, and whose care, is just not worth the cost and 
trouble? The public views efforts by politicians or  
bureaucrats to make such judgments as “death  
panels” or “rationing.” In contrast, a great advantage 
of shared decision-making, we think, is that instead of 
kicking absolute-value decisions upstairs to  
politicians and insurers, it kicks them downstairs to 
patients —who, it turns out, often will make sound 
decisions about preference-sensitive care when given 
sound information. Shared decision-making also 
should be used for decisions around end-of-life care. 
The edge of fear and the veil of ignorance, which  
together skew decisions about medical value and 
health-care values, need not be accepted as given. 
 For all of those reasons, we believe it is time to 
move shared decision-making higher up the list of 
health reform priorities. Policy should strive to move it 
through the experimental stage and toward broader 
adoption. The government’s new Center for Medicare 
and Medicaid Innovation (created by the health reform 
68  Ibid., p. 6.
69  A.M. O’Connor, et al. “Decision Aids for People Facing Health Treatment or Screening Decisions.” Cochrane Database System Rev. July 2009, 
8(3): CD 001431. 
70 The Lewin Group, “A Path to a High Performance U.S. Health System: Technical Documentation,” Figure 53 (February 2009).
71 Foundation for Informed Medical Decision Making, “Questions and Answers,” undated.
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law) should make a point of funding pilot programs in 
every state; state legislatures should revise informed 
consent laws to make shared decision-making the 
gold standard of informed consent. Such measures are 
no pipe dream: Washington state already has begun 
to reform its informed consent statutes; Vermont and 
Maine have pilots underway; Minnesota, Oklahoma, 
Massachusetts, and New Hampshire are considering 
legislation. Still in the planning stages are private and 
government-backed groups to evaluate and certify  
decision aids (it is very important that these aids, 
which can come in the form of a brochure, video, or 
web-based guide, be clear, accurate, and free of bias 
and merchandising). 
 We have no illusions that shared decision-making, 
by itself, can bend the cost curve dramatically. In some 
cases, more informed consumers may demand more 
costly treatments. Moreover, in the long run, shared 
decision-making can only supplement, rather than  
substitute for, some difficult public-policy choices 
about what government programs and private insurers 
will and will not pay for. What it can do, however, is 
take important steps toward letting the people who 
know and care the most—patients—define and seek 
value. And it can reduce the most egregious examples 
of medical care departing from patient preference.
Giving Patients Pecuniary Incentives  
to Find Value
 This paper has returned time and again to the 
theme of incentives. We have discussed the need to 
rewire incentive structures to give providers and  
insurers more reason to search for value, and more 
rewards when they succeed. In our judgment, it is also 
important to engage consumers in that quest.
 In the long run, we think consumers will be  
happier in a world where they have more influence 
over the system and more control over their own care. 
In the shorter term, however, asking consumers to 
shoulder more of the burden of shopping and paying 
for care is unlikely to feel like a gift. From a Medicare 
patient’s point of view, what’s not to like about  
going to see a doctor, ponying up a small copayment, 
and thinking no more about it? The whole problem, 
however, is that Medicare is eating the government’s 
budget alive, and today’s sweet deal is eventually  
going to go away. Given the available choices,  
we think, policies that give patients more  
responsibility and control over their health care  
are likelier to sit better with the public in the long  
run than are bureaucratic controls that further  
reduce the patient’s perceived role and influence.
 Until now, the usual way politicians have  
thought about making patients more cost-sensitive 
is to increase copayments for Medicare and other 
consumer-borne costs. Employers have been  
applying the same ratchet by passing on a growing 
share of health insurance premiums to employees. 
This kind of additional “skin in the game” succeeds 
in shifting costs to consumers and, thus, deferring 
the crunch on corporate and federal treasuries, but it 
has not, to date, had a discernible impact on the cost 
curve. Employees and Medicare recipients may reduce 
their utilization marginally, but not by much, and what 
they are most likely to cut back on, at least initially, 
is preventive and routine care, the least costly kind, 
and where short-term savings can cause long-term 
expenditures. Today’s foregone vaccine is tomorrow’s 
hospitalization for pneumonia. Marginally higher  
copayments also are likely to have relatively little effect 
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on the use of high-cost acute care and end-of-life 
treatment when patients or their families tend to do 
whatever it takes to resolve an immediate problem or 
extend life.
 More important, however, is this: raising  
copayments a bit might give consumers a bit more 
reason to look for value, but they also need to be 
able to find it. If they don’t know how much care 
costs, and if they don’t know what how much value 
they are getting, and if, especially, they don’t share in 
any upside from seeking value—in that case, raising 
copayments may induce them to consume less, but it 
will not induce them to consume better, which is even 
more important.
 What policymakers are looking for, then, are  
measures that do one or more of these three things:
n   Increase cost transparency: provide patients 
with more information about the underlying costs 
to them (not some artificial bill submitted to an 
insurance company) of the service with which they 
are being provided—something which, today, they 
usually cannot find out even if they try;
n   Improve value transparency: provide patients 
with more information about the relative  
effectiveness of medical care—something that  
is scarce today (you can find better and more  
accessible information when choosing a car or 
camera than when choosing a doctor or hospital);
n   Create positive as well as negative incentives: 
allow patients who discover value to pocket some 
of the dollars they find.
 Policymakers have made various efforts toward 
embodying those goals. Health savings accounts, 
for instance, let people set aside tax-favored funds 
earmarked for health care and insurance and allow 
people to keep what they don’t spend. It is too early, 
however, to know how effective HSAs will be in  
reducing cost without sacrificing care. 
 More far-reaching is a reform we believe is  
inevitable, and which has had some bipartisan  
support and heritage: converting government  
health care assistance from its current fee-for-service 
reimbursement model to one that pays for insurance 
premiums. A “premium support” system, ideally one 
whose support payments are determined progressively 
(as incomes of recipients increase, their government 
support payments decline), would permit households 
to choose their health care insurance coverage  
packages and providers, just as they do for other 
forms of insurance now, and, in the process, let 
individuals choose what kind of coverage they want 
and what they are willing to pay for.72 The best role 
for government is to assure the minimum amounts 
of guaranteed coverage to individuals, especially for 
catastrophic illnesses, but to do so without exposing 
taxpayers to the runaway costs that currently are  
embedded in the Medicare and Medicaid programs. 
 Government also may have a significant role  
in encouraging price and value transparency. The  
2010 reform steps in that direction by collecting  
performance data on physicians who participate in 
Medicare and then publishing it online, on a website 
similar to the existing Hospital Compare and Nursing 
Home Compare websites.73 As always, expectations 
for reducing costs by such methods should be  
72  Ideally, premium support payments also would be tied to regional variations in health care costs and to the health of the individual at the time 
he or she is eligible for assistance.
73 2011 Economic Report of the President, p. 114.
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realistically modest, especially at first. Evidence  
suggests that, when patients shop for care, they first 
consider quality and provider reputation, not cost.74 
Still, we think additional increments of transparency 
can only redound to the good.
Altering Patient Behavior
 Up to this point in the chapter, we have  
concentrated on how patients, perhaps encouraged 
by monetary incentives, can take better charge of their 
own health care. But patients’ need for health care 
in the first instance is heavily influenced by their own 
behaviors. Two of them come to mind: smoking and 
obesity. 
 There is much stronger evidence and consensus 
about the first than the second. The harsh physical toll 
on those who smoke is now so well established that it 
is difficult for the current generation of young adults 
to imagine the world in which their parents (and their 
parents) grew up, bombarded by advertising about 
the joy of smoking and by the wide social acceptance 
of the practice. 
 Although young people today are less likely to 
take up smoking than their parents were, too many 
American adults who already have begun (and larger 
numbers outside the United States) find themselves 
unable to quit. Here, too, various incentive schemes 
may help. One particularly intriguing idea is for 
smokers to commit to pay a third party if they fail to 
quit.75 A related notion is for employers to pay their 
employees to quit. Still another promising approach is 
to bring peer pressure on smokers to quit in Alcoholics 
Anonymous-like settings.
 Obesity is more problematic. Though it has been 
linked with a variety of ailments, notably diabetes, 
the line between being overweight and obese is not a 
clear one. Nor is it clear how to address the problem. 
There is a high level of recidivism among even  
temporarily successful dieters. While research  
continues to identify and possibly modify the “obesity 
genes,” those outcomes are still in the distant future.
Give Patients a Portal to the Data Stream
 A final kind of patient empowerment allows us 
to revisit an earlier theme: mobilizing data. What is 
often overlooked is that, although people have a lot 
of knowledge about their health and their experiences 
with health care, they often do not own their  
knowledge. Strange though it may seem, medical 
records and samples typically belong to the health 
provider, not the consumer.
 That policy and others like it should be  
reconsidered, with a default assumption being that 
any information or sample collected from a health care 
consumer belongs to the consumer, who can share it 
as she pleases—for instance, by indicating proactively 
to health providers that data is to be released for 
comparative effectiveness studies and other research. 
We have already discussed portable informed consent, 
data collection outside of the medical system, and 
other measures to let willing consumers more  
easily share their knowledge and experience with 
researchers and data entrepreneurs. We have yet 
to discuss how to connect individuals to the river of 
information and knowledge that will flow from their 
uploads. A good way forward is with what we think 
of as a “life certificate.”
 At present, every American is issued a birth  
certificate and, eventually, a death certificate. But, 
between birth and death, little is done to catalog  
74  See, e.g., Ha T. Tu and Johanna Lauer, “Word of Mouth and Physician Referrals Still Drive Health Care Provider Choice.” Center for Studying 
Health System Change Research Brief No. 9, December 2008. http://hschange.org/CONTENT/1028/. Accessed August 24, 2011.
75  See Ian Ayres and Barry Nalebuff, Lifecycle Investing: A New, Safe, and Audacious Way to Improve the Performance of Your Retirement  
Portfolio (Basic Books, 2010).
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and standardize the large amounts of information 
collected by medical providers, insurance companies, 
schools, and other entities about people’s health and 
medical histories—and much of what is collected is 
not readily available to consumers themselves. Many 
people, for example, have trouble recollecting which 
vaccinations they received as children and when; or 
never learn what type of stent was inserted; or may 
recall as appendicitis what was, in fact, diverticulitis. 
And what exactly was that medication they were on 
thirteen years ago? In an emergency, some of this  
information might make the difference between life 
and death, and waiting hours or days to get it—the 
time it can take to get in touch by phone or fax with 
the right provider and pull the proper file—is, in 
today’s world, ludicrous. Even in a non-emergency, 
such information is a diagnostic boon, and asking 
distracted, anxious patients to fill out forms in the 
doctor’s waiting room is hardly an accurate or efficient 
way to get it.
 The “life certificate” is a bundle of standardized 
health information that would travel around with  
consumers and accumulate as they pass through 
health-related gateways: vaccinations (up to date 
for tetanus?), procedures (had a tonsillectomy?), 
medications (which antibiotics?), family history (colon 
polyps?), and so on. Importantly, the life certificate 
would belong to the consumer, not the government 
or providers, and would travel with the consumer. 
Also importantly, the information would be uploaded 
in a standardized, machine-readable format, so that 
the life certificate could immediately “talk” to multiple 
databases. With a patient’s consent, ideally opt-out 
to ensure maximum coverage, information would be 
added routinely by providers and, especially, by  
insurers, who are billed for and therefore know about 
most treatments that most people undergo. 
 In the short run, a life certificate would help move 
people and information through the system more 
smoothly while preventing errors. But, over time, 
something grander will be possible. Over time, the life 
certificate would become, in effect, the consumer’s 
passport to the health care datasphere that we  
envisioned in Chapter Two. Think of it as his or her 
portal to the health information “cloud.” Combined 
with information harvested by data entrepreneurs 
from billions of data points, and with knowledge 
gleaned from genomic profiling, a swipe of the life 
certificate could tell a physician—or a physician’s  
assistant or nurse practitioner—a lot of what they 
need to know about what ails the patient, or what 
probably will ail him, and how (and how not) to treat 
it, before they even set eyes on him. 
 Who would be tasked with creating and  
maintaining this life certificate? We think the federal 
government could help create a demand for it by  
providing incentives for research and development of 
the idea. Perhaps most important, participants should 
be able to get any data generated about them. 
 Clearly, a variety of technical issues will need  
to be worked out: encryption, portability, rules for  
access, and so on—that is what the research and  
development phase is for. But the main thing is to  
establish a principle. The combination of consumers 
who own, or at least are able to access, their own 
health data suggests the potential for all kinds of 
knowledge transactions, linking health consumers  
not just to doctors but also to scholars, data  
entrepreneurs, disease support groups, drug  
developers, and many others. Though not a  
replacement for the stethoscope, this passport to  
the cloud promises ultimately to be far more  
powerful an instrument. 
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The Case for (Guarded) Optimism
 Over the course of the meetings that laid the 
groundwork for this report, a convergence developed. 
On the one hand, we had clinicians and researchers 
talking about the challenges of innovating in medical 
science; on the other, economists, administrators,  
and legal experts talking about the challenges of 
innovating in health policy. Their two worlds meet, 
of course, in the nexus between the hospital that 
provides care and the insurer or government program 
that pays for it. But they turned out to meet in a more 
fundamental respect, which can be boiled down to 
the word complexity.
 A recurring theme among scientists in the  
discussion was that medical biology is the hardest  
of sciences. “If only it were as easy as rocket  
science!” one task force member bemoaned.  
Biology is hard because life is complex and adaptive; 
laboratory biomedicine is harder still, because of the 
incalculable variety of pathologies and treatments and 
the even larger numbers of ways they can interact 
with the body; clinical medicine is hardest of all, 
because one must deal with human beings, the most 
complex and unpredictable of creatures. True, the 
twentieth century produced unprecedented medical 
innovation, but most of the low-hanging fruits,  
our biologists agreed, have been plucked. Today,  
researchers find that almost nothing works in the 
body as one expects from lab results, and not much 
works at all. This is not to sound a note of gloom; it  
is merely to acknowledge the reality that biomedicine 
is hard.
 An emergent theme among the policy wonks  
was that health care is the hardest of policy areas. “If 
only Medicare were as easy as Social Security!” was 
a common refrain. Many policy areas need to deal 
Chapter five
Conclusion: Coping 
with Complexity
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with tight resources and a fiscal crunch, which is hard; 
some—public pensions, education, and others— 
need to cope with periodic and sometimes severe 
demographic pressures; a few (think of the federal 
agricultural support programs) must cope with  
markets that have been distorted by decades of  
often-counterproductive government policy; and  
a handful are simply so big that whenever they 
sneeze, the entire government gets fiscal pneumonia  
(Medicare, Medicaid, and Social Security head this list). 
But health policy poses all of those challenges at once, 
and then some. As with health care, so with health 
policy: interventions that seem likely to work in  
principle often mysteriously fizzle amid the complexity 
of the health care economy and the political  
ecosystem in which it is embedded. It isn’t that  
nothing works; only that figuring out what works  
is hard, and getting it implemented can be harder. 
Politics can make even biology look simple.
 This is one reason we have tried to fix our gaze on 
the adjacent possible: measures capable of producing 
incremental gains even if adopted on a less-than- 
grandiose scale, while planting seeds for greater  
progress in years ahead; measures re-channeling  
incentives rather than swimming against their  
currents; and measures that can be and preferably  
are being tried, tested, and adopted or adapted. It  
is also why we have tried to emphasize keeping  
short-term and medium-term expectations realistic, 
even while remaining inspired by the potential for 
dramatic improvement in the long term.
 We hope, though, that our approach does not 
induce defeatism or pessimism. Neither is warranted. 
Rather, our own feeling is one of guarded optimism, 
based on factors such as:
n   New informational tools are coming on line. 
Nothing like the data stream and the tools for  
tapping into it that are now emerging has ever 
been available for health care; in a sense, data 
“microscopy” brings the cellular anatomy of the 
health care system into view when, heretofore,  
we had only the informational equivalent of the 
naked eye.
n   There is wide agreement on the need to  
reform incentives in fundamental ways.  
In our group, there was no one, from any  
discipline or sector, who defended traditional, 
procedure-based fee-for-service and transaction-
maximizing insurance as a sensible model for  
medicine. Changing the incentives will be difficult 
and gradual, but everyone acknowledges it needs  
to happen. 
n   Severe fiscal pressure forces change. One way 
and another, the economy and the political system 
have managed until recently to find new money 
to pour into the bottomless hole of fee-for-service 
medicine, but this cannot go on forever. As the 
late economist Herbert Stein used to say, what 
cannot go on forever will stop. If health care costs 
are not increasingly tethered to value, rather than 
soaring ever upward simply because they can, the 
system will crash. Indeed, it is in the midst of a 
slow-motion crash already. This is painful, but with 
the pain of crisis comes opportunity for change, 
and this remains true even though health care 
reform ostensibly was “solved” by the Affordable 
Care Act.
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n   The availability of multiple incremental  
paths forward. There is one respect in which 
biomedicine and health policy are not alike: when 
it comes to improving health care efficiency and 
value, the trees are practically groaning with  
low-hanging fruit. It may seem odd to draw  
comfort from the pervasiveness of the current 
system’s flaws, but in one sense we do. Fixing the 
system is hard. Improving it is easy.
 Health policy has never experienced the kind of 
rapid advance that health care experienced in the 
middle decades of the last century. Perhaps it is on the 
cusp of doing so now. By way of thinking about how 
better information, better incentives, and pressure for 
change might combine to produce many billions or 
even some trillions of dollars in new value over  
the next decade or two, we conclude by drawing 
attention to the emerging science of health care 
delivery.
The Promise of Comparative Efficiency
 Medical patients are not airplanes, but if they 
were, we would know far more than we do today 
about how to treat them effectively and efficiently. 
This is not only because humans are even more  
complicated than airplanes; it is also because every 
step of the complicated pathway that turns a heap 
of aluminum ore into a jetliner has undergone the 
scrutiny of analysts seeking to find and propagate best 
practices, whereas virtually none of the complicated 
pathways that begin when you see your doctor have 
undergone such scrutiny.
 A company that builds airplanes carefully  
monitors and adjusts its assembly process—or, rather, 
processes, since hundreds of separate procedures 
need to be streamed together. How many steps does 
assembly require? Is there an unnecessary step  
slowing everything down? Where are the bottlenecks? 
Why does one factory produce higher quality or  
operate more safely than another? Which vendors 
perform best, and how can underperformers be 
improved? The costs of inputs—raw materials, labor, 
parts, subcontractors—are closely monitored and 
mined for savings. Output, too, gets watched: the 
airplane quality is checked; the production speed 
clocked; the customers’ approval gauged.
 Health care is different. One reason, and a  
good one, is that people aren’t planes and do not 
want to be treated as objects on an assembly line. 
Medicine faces inherent limits to the desirability and 
effectiveness of standardization and benchmarking 
that no industrial manufacturer needs to think about.
 But then, there are the many bad reasons health 
care is different. One is that, as we have seen, what 
we call “health care” is, in fact, a huge assortment 
of procedures, tests, treatments, diagnostic methods, 
and personnel choices that grew up rapidly in the 
second half of the last century with minimal testing 
of whether they actually led to improved health. Once 
past regulatory approval (if approval was needed), a 
treatment was subject only to physicians’ approval  
or disapproval—perhaps a reasonable enough  
arrangement when medicine was a much simpler  
science, but an invitation to chaos today.
 A second bad reason is that, again, as we  
have seen, health providers, unlike airplane  
manufacturers, save no money by finding efficiencies; 
in fact, becoming more efficient normally costs them 
money by reducing the number of procedures they 
perform. Given the perverse incentives of fee-for-
service payment, it would be a wonder if any health 
provider ever considered efficiency at all.
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 Suppose, then, the same patient goes to two  
hospitals complaining of back pain. Hospital No. 1 
gives her an MRI. Her scan turns up something that 
might be disc damage, so she is sent to a neurologist, 
who orders more tests, leading to a cascade of further 
procedures and possibly surgery. Hospital No. 2, 
looking at the same patient with the same pain—or, 
for that matter, even Physician No. 2 at Hospital No. 
1—diagnoses uncomplicated back pain and tells the 
patient to take Advil® and see if the pain goes away 
on its own, and maybe also refers her to a physical 
therapist.
 Which pathway is better, for this particular  
patient or on average? The startling answer is  
that no one knows, because patient outcomes of  
various medical pathways are not systematically  
measured. Comparative effectiveness research,  
which we discussed in Chapter Three and which  
is beginning to receive more effort and attention,  
can help answer that question. However, another  
comparative dimension has been even more  
neglected: comparative efficiency. Of many  
possible care pathways, which achieve the best  
ratios of outputs to inputs? Where relative value— 
not just relative efficacy—is concerned, the pathways 
through treatment have never been systematically 
compared, analyzed, or rationalized. In many cases, 
hospitals and providers do not even systematically 
track the costs of inputs, because they were in a  
position to pass those costs along.
 Very embryonically, this is beginning to change  
as more providers and policymakers have awakened  
to the need to analyze and rationalize treatment  
pathways and input-output relationships. Some  
hospitals, for example, are instituting “lean”  
production processes and quality-improvement  
techniques inspired by Japanese manufacturing.  
“We map out the current processes,” an official of 
University of Iowa Hospitals and Clinics in Iowa City 
recently said. “We start to identify which steps are 
non-value-added from the customer perspective.”76 
Others use software and other analytical tools to track 
labor costs and treatment flows, reducing waiting 
times and hospitalization stays.
 Meanwhile, some research organizations per-
form research on comparative efficiency. A prominent 
example is the Dartmouth Institute for Health Policy 
and Clinical Practice, whose Dartmouth Atlas project 
mines Medicare data to document “glaring variations 
in how medical resources are distributed and used in 
the United States.”77 It documents, for example, the 
wide range across regions and hospitals in the number 
of chronically ill patients seeing more than ten doctors 
in their last six months of life (46 percent in Sun City, 
a retirement community near Phoenix; only 15 percent 
in Salt Lake City); in the rates at which patients receive 
preference-sensitive discretionary surgery such as knee 
or hip replacements; and in the rates at which patients 
are admitted to the hospital, a decision that often has 
little science behind it. “The prevalence and severity of 
illness accounts for remarkably little of the variation in 
care,” according to the Institute.78 
 Needless to say, hospitals’ efforts to  
rationalize their treatment pathways are welcome. 
Comparative analysis of the sort Dartmouth is  
performing with Medicare data helps flag outliers 
whose practices may be particularly costly or  
inefficient. But hospitals adapting Japanese  
production methods will themselves remain outliers  
as long as payment incentives are to maximize inputs 
76  Dave DeWitte, “Hospitals Keep an Eye on Costs.” Business380, July 31, 2011. http://business380.com/2011/07/31/hospitals-keep-an-eye-on-
costs/. Accessed September 1, 2011.
77  Shannon Brownlee, a member of the present task force, is affiliated with the Dartmouth Institute.
78  http://www.dartmouthatlas.org/data/topic/. Accessed September 1, 2011.
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and volume of care delivered. And Medicare data  
of the sort that Dartmouth analyzes can reveal that 
some hospitals, say, are more efficient than others, but 
it lacks the granularity to look into the “black box” 
of a particular hospital and uncover the particular 
pathways that account for its relative standing—and, 
of course, it provides data only on the relatively elderly 
Medicare population.
 We believe that comparative efficiency research 
is ripe to be taken to a new level. If it were applied 
in health care with anything like the regularity and 
granularity taken for granted in, say, manufacturing, 
the savings could be astronomical, and outcomes 
would be better to boot. How, then, to reach a new 
level? We see at least four places to exert leverage:
 First, employers can and should demand that 
providers do a better job of tracking efficiency. More 
than 80 percent of large companies (those with 500 
or more employees) self-insure for at least one health 
plan.79 They have clout with providers and in their 
communities, but to date have made little use of 
it. Many tend to take a passive attitude toward the 
health care bills they pay as insurers, rather than  
viewing those costs as potentially manageable  
expenses—subject to the same kinds of negotiations 
with vendors as are other expenses and inputs. Too 
often, health care is relegated to the HR department 
and treated as a given, rather than subjected to the 
MBA-style scrubbing that production expenses receive. 
If health care production needs to be treated more 
like aircraft production, at least where efficiency is 
concerned, that is partly because the kinds of people 
who produce aircraft have not turned their attention 
to health care, even when they are paying for it. This 
lacuna not only ought to change, but, we suspect, 
gradually will as business, like government, discovers 
it can no longer pour money into the black hole of 
health care (though we acknowledge that there will 
be resistance from various parties along the way). 
 Second, that word again: data. Medicare data is 
a start, but it covers only one demographic group (the 
elderly), records procedures but not medical outcomes 
(other than death), and is published with long lags. 
For comparative efficiency analysis to attain anything 
like its full potential, more data will need to be  
available more quickly. The government should  
report Medicare data with a lag of weeks or months, 
and the cost to receive it should be reduced. 
 More important, however, is bringing to bear  
the torrent of data collected by health insurance  
providers, which, between them, record most of the 
medical procedures that non-elderly Americans  
undergo. Unfortunately, insurance companies tend  
to resist sharing data, even though using it for  
comparative efficiency research could be a boon to 
them. We believe that governments could help by  
providing incentives to share and upload insurance 
data, and by providing reasonable shelter from  
litigation for companies that join the information 
stream. 
 Even then, however, having the data is only  
one step. A new system must be created and  
staffed with the right kind of people. This requires 
individuals with the right kinds of analytical training 
to distill knowledge from the more expansive data 
universe and to learn from experience. All this will 
need to be carried out while subjecting the people to 
whom the data pertain to the least acceptable risk, 
almost surely with rules that foster the common good 
while protecting individual rights and interests. The 
data analysts whom we will need to carry out these 
new and critically important functions will be trained 
79  U.S. Department of Health and Human Services, Report to the Congress on a Study of the Large Group Market, 2011. http://aspe.hhs.gov/
health/reports/2011/LGHPstudy/index.shtml. Accessed September 1, 2011.
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and housed in universities, in hospitals, in  
pharmaceutical companies, and very likely, in  
entirely new kinds of entities. 
 Third, the science of health care delivery  
deserves its own national research program. Today, 
comparative efficiency research is overshadowed by 
comparative effectiveness research, which itself claims 
a mere sliver of the $30 billion the United States 
spends on health research—almost all of it devoted  
to biomedical research; less than 4 percent of research 
funding goes toward understanding how the care- 
delivery ecosystem actually works.80 If the study of 
care delivery were a medical science, it would still be 
in the era of Harvey and Leeuwenhoek, aware that 
blood circulates and that bacteria exist but not  
knowing much more than that.
 Finally, and not least important: for  
comparative efficiency analysis to become  
common currency in American health care,  
providers need to be given incentives to do it. This is 
yet another reason to move away from fee-for-service 
payment, with its upside-down incentive structure.  
Accountable care organizations, discussed previously, 
are one example of a potentially upright incentive 
structure. A further step away from fee-for-service 
would be taken by so-called “global payments,”  
under which providers are reimbursed not for  
procedures performed on individuals but for the 
health outcomes attained with a group of patients 
over a set period of time. In effect, providers receive  
a fixed budget to take responsibility for the health of a 
certain number of people; the more efficiently they do 
that (within acceptable quality guidelines), the more  
profitable they will be. As with accountable care  
organizations—but moving even further than many 
ACOs from procedure-based reimbursement—global 
payments incentivize providers to find savings, not to 
pass along costs.
 Global payments remain in their infancy, and early 
results are mixed. Examining global payments used 
by some insurers in Massachusetts, for instance, that 
state’s attorney general recently found that “globally 
paid providers do not have consistently lower total 
medical expenses.” Reforming payment structures 
alone, the A.G. found, is not enough: “It is [also]  
essential that businesses and consumers be engaged 
in efforts to promote a value-based health care 
market” by being given incentives and information to 
seek value.81 That global payments offer no immediate 
magic bullet solution will come as no surprise to those 
who appreciate the theme of this chapter, health  
delivery’s complexity. Reform, like a sophisticated plan 
of treatment, must take multiple pathways and will 
take years to penetrate throughout the system.
 The case for moving away from fee-for-service  
is not that it will solve the problem by itself (nothing 
will do that) or that it will have dramatic effects  
immediately (nothing will do that, either), but that  
it is a necessary element of change, especially in  
the long term. Bringing analytical rigor to the  
production process will take years in health care, as 
it did in manufacturing; but getting incentives right 
is the necessary precondition of making the science 
of health care delivery part of the everyday fabric of 
the health care business, which eventually it should 
become.
 Although, as we have often said, we do not 
believe in magic bullets, we do believe in low-hanging 
fruit. Developing a science of health care delivery and 
realizing its findings—rather than going about all 
80  In 2009, the NIH spent roughly $1.1 billion of its total research budget on health services research. See Coalition for Health Services Research. 
“2009 Federal Funding for Health Services Research.” May 2010. http://www.chsr.org/reports.htm.
81  Office of Massachusetts Attorney General Martha Coakley, Examination of Health Care Cost Trends and Cost Drivers, June 22, 2011, pp. 5 
and 51.
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too much of what health care does in a more or less 
random fashion—is perhaps the lowest-hanging and 
ripest fruit on the tree.
A Choice of Paths
 We conclude by asking ourselves a question. 
Where is the American health care system today?
 We know, at any rate, where it came from. A 
half-century and more ago, most doctors were family 
physicians, and specialists were exotic beasts, seen on 
rare occasions for difficult cases.82 A well-informed 
physician could know a lot of what there was to know 
about medicine. Many conditions had only a handful 
of treatment paths. Insurance did not cost very much 
because, among other reasons, medicine could not  
do all that much. Medicare did not exist. Late-life 
treatment was relatively cheap, because so many  
retirees died young (by today’s standards), instead 
of living for years with multiple chronic conditions. 
Insurance was linked to employment because of a 
World War II era tax break; payment was linked to 
procedures because, in a less complicated world, that 
seemed a natural way to bill. Incentives were aligned 
with the idiosyncrasies of the time, and, in that era, 
they were more or less functional. America had good 
health care, given the state of medical science at the 
time. And it had a good health care system.
 But where, exactly, is the health care system 
today? The answer is that it might be in either of two 
places. It might be forging ahead technologically but 
mired structurally in the past. The system’s incentives 
remain, alas, much as they were fifty years ago, and 
Medicare’s fee-for-service structure has helped  
keep them there; but the world has changed and  
the old incentives are anachronistic to the point of 
dysfunctionality. If left unchanged, they cannot help 
but provoke—or, rather, hasten—the systemic crisis 
that is already beginning to occur.
 Or the system might be somewhere else. It might 
be at the doorstep of a gradual but eventually decisive 
transition to improvement and efficiency. It might be 
at a place where previously undreamt-of analytical 
tools, sifting through mountains of previously  
inaccessible information, can give the system the 
knowledge about effectiveness and the awareness  
of itself that it has lacked; where paths beyond fee-
for-service are clearly visible ahead; where patients, 
providers, and even politicians are coming to  
recognize the inevitability and desirability of change; 
and where, in pockets of innovation around the  
country, change is proving its mettle.
 We don’t pretend to be sure where the system is. 
But we think it is in the latter place. And we believe 
the suggestions in this report can help make it so.
82  Paul Starr, The Social Transformation of American Medicine: The Rise of a Sovereign Profession and the Making of a Vast Industry  
(Basic Books, 1984). 
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